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  Through the concept of orientation, this essay attempts to establish a philosophical 
account of the structure of our daily lives.  By examining Kant’s notion of orientation and 
Heidegger’s response to Kant, I highlight the importance of the fact that orientation 
comes from the world, not simply from our ability to determine our position in the world 
by means of a coordinate system.  Consequently, I argue, the concrete instantiation of a 
life given in a narrative can supplement the structure that the theoretical framework of 
justice, which establishes the principles guiding the institutions of our society, claims to 
leave undetermined.  This texture fills the space of justice and culture with tangible 
things and practices that make up our daily life.  The novel America America is used as a 
diagnostic tool to illuminate the forces and opportunities found in our culture that need to 
be either recognized and avoided, or discovered, revealed, and spoken for.  I suggest that 
instrumental reason and the attainment of mere pleasure, as a cultural forces guiding our 
practices, fail to provide a tenable answer to the question of the good life and that they 
should be avoided when we are considering the ultimate how and what of the practices 
that make up the structure of our lives.  In response to the failure of instrumental reason, I 
propose a deepening of our practices by way of familiarity (through closeness) and 
accomplishment (through engagement) with the things that are integral to practices such 
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Discovering Orientation between Theory and Narrative
Introduction 
The concept of orientation needs to be understood relative to a specific domain. 
If I were the captain of a ship in the fifteenth century and spoke of orientation, I would be 
speaking of the ability to navigate from shore to shore over the expansive sea.  Here the 
stars could be used as a means of orientation.  By fixing one’s heading relative to a given 
star, the celestial mark can act as a guide to fulfill the need for orientation. Without this 
guide the captain’s efforts to get from one location to another would, perhaps, be 
arbitrary or built upon superstition.  The captain’s efforts would not make sense, and we 
could only blame chance for any success that came from them.  The means of orientation 
for sea captains have changed with the advent of portable and accurate clocks, sonar, 
radar, computing, and satellite technology, but the concept of orientation (in this domain) 
has remained the same:  the captain must have some guide such that his or her efforts 
make sense or add up with respect to the task of navigating from one place to another.1  
By beginning with this navigational notion of orientation, I hope to move into the 
project at hand.  I want to ask:  (1) Can the notion of orientation be applied to our lives 
with the hope that we can find some type of guide to help steer us towards whatever it 
may mean to live a good life?  To answer this question we would have to figure out 
where we are (our current cultural/social predicament) and where we should be (some 
general notion of the good-life).  And, in order to get from one to the other, we have to 
find a guide such that we can navigate our way.  (2) Can the notion of orientation be 
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applied to the choices we make in our ordinary lives?  This is the question that will help 
us determine the content of the domain or boundaries within which the notion of 
orientation to the good life can be applied.  (3) Is there an inconspicuous reality that 
should come into relief out of the background of all possible realities in such a way that 
an orientation to it would be a large part of what it means to live a good life?  (4) Is it 
possible to extract principles from actual lives so that these principles could act as a guide 
to help us understand and be oriented to the good life?  (5) Is the pursuit of the good life 
something that can be or should be understood in terms of orientation?    
I will begin, in Chapter One, by analyzing different conceptions of orientation 
with the hope of finding one that is applicable to the domain I am interested in.  With this 
concept in hand, I will proceed to review how John Rawls’ theory of political justice 
helps answer the questions I am asking but remains an insufficient answer.  Next, I will 
analyze Charles Taylor’s notion of distinct and particular frameworks that he claims acts 
as the guide needed for individuals to have orientation in their lives. 
Chapter Two will address the notion of finding orientation between theory and 
narrative.  I will attempt to propose an original way in which orientation within our 
ordinary lives may be found.  Orientation, I will argue, can be found when a political 
theory like Rawls’ is supplemented with narratives that (1) act as a diagnostic tool in that 
they can bring into relief, in a concrete way, the content of the forces in our culture that 
structure our lives, and (2) can speak for good ways of life that have as one of their 
boundaries (implicitly or explicitly) the principles of justice, but go beyond these 
principles in terms of the content they express about the possible ways in which we can 
live.  
2
I want to turn to narratives in the hope of finding people who can speak of ways 
of life that are rich and meaningful.  I turn away from theory and towards narratives 
because the mode in which a rich and meaningful life is to be presented requires the 
expansive looseness of a narrative - the room to speak for something - and theoretical 
writing doesn’t afford this space.  
Other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have begun focusing on 
narrative in a whole array of different ways.  Since the 1970’s movement, now called the 
“narrative turn,” historians, sociologists, linguists, political scientists, psychologists, and 
others have begun to incorporate narratives into their studies either as the object of their 
investigation or as a way to organize what is being studied.2  For example, in the field of 
psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts “began inquiring whether the object of analysis was not 
so much archaeologically to reconstruct a life as it was to help the patient construct a 
more contradiction-free and generative narrative of it.”3  Instead of digging up past 
trauma and simply revealing it to the patient, the field of psychoanalysis became 
interested in the entire context within which the trauma affected a patient’s life.  What 
constituted the context (past, present, and future) could be understood as a narrative, and 
analysts began attempting to assist patients in constructing “contradiction-free and 
generative” narratives of their lives. 
Philosophy has become concerned with narrative as well.  Philosophers such as 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor agree that the way in which we conceive of our 
own lives should be a narrative conception.  My claim for narratives is less fundamental, 
but it has narrative playing a crucial role in the way in which orientation in our lives can 
be discovered.  I believe that it is within specific narratives, presented in such a way that 
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they are compelling enough to be taken up with, that we can acquire guidance towards 
ways of life that can add depth and meaning to our lives within a political framework that 
ensures justice.  
The novel America America, by Ethan Canin, will be the first narrative I work 
with.  I will present a reading of this novel as if it were a diagnosis for several of the 
problems within our culture.  Narratives such as America America can be helpful in 
diagnosing the problems of society, but they are also capable of revealing orienting forces 
within society.  Attempting to combine the virtues of narrative with the way importance 
or significance is incorporated into our lives can function to supplement a political theory 
of justice in philosophy’s attempt to attend to all aspects of our lives.  This, I will argue, 
is the way to orientation.
The structure of a narrative can be related to the time-elapsed events or to the 
trajectory of a life.  We start somewhere, something happens, and we come to some 
conclusion.  All events walk this line; all lives are lived this way.  The narratives that I 
will investigate in this essay do exactly this while at the same time they are embedded in 
the culture that I am philosophizing from.  This combination makes the structure and the 
content of narratives relevant to the patterns and content of our lives.  I have chosen 
narratives that are fictional as well as reports of actual events. Both fictional and non-
fictional narratives can serve as the concrete content from which the discussion of the 
good life can draw.  
Henry James, in discussing the art of fiction, writes that “The only reason for the 
existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent life.”4  He says that the “novel is 
history” and only differs from history in the manner of collecting and the type of 
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evidence used.5  Arguing against the free flight of a writer’s fancy, James scorns the 
attitude that an author “can give his narrative any turn the reader may like best.”6  He 
says, “Such a betrayal of a sacred office seems to me, I confess, a terrible crime…It 
implies that the novelist is less occupied in looking for the truth (the truth, of course I 
mean, that he assumes, the premises that we must grant him, whatever they may be), than 
the historian, and in doing so it deprives him at a stroke of all his standing-room.”7  The 
type of truth that James seems to be speaking of is one that resonates with the author in 
the most important way.  It is not a truth that simply serves as the background for a thrill 
ride through a literary world or the type of truth that is, without purpose, squeezed out of 
some logical mechanism.  Rather, it is an important truth that has been extracted from 
experience and compels the author to center a text on it and do her best to serve, defend, 
explicate, articulate, and explore it.  Similarly in philosophy, it is the type of truth that 
serves as the impulse for arguments and examples for something; in contrast to arguing 
because it is merely possible to argue.  
I will use Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to help articulate the 
problems presented in America America. Also, I will attempt to salvage an orienting 
force which the novel presents as having significance in our lives.  I will be guided in my 
explanation of what an orienting force is by Martin Heidegger’s essay “Art and Space.”
Chapter three will attempt to respond to the disorientation that partially describes 
the main character at the end of America America and the disorientation that can be seen 
as a general malaise of our culture.  Here the explanation of what an orientating force 
does is set up by two essays of Heidegger’s, “The Thing” and “Building Dwelling 
Thinking.”  As we will see, an explanation of the orienting force isn’t enough to establish 
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the power of things behind the force; someone speaking for the thing providing 
orientation is required for the force or power of the thing to become evident.  To do this I 
will turn to two narratives in which specific things and practices are spoken for.  The first 
narrative will suggest a specific orienting force Corey can incorporate into his life.  The 
second narrative will suggest a practice that almost anyone can take up with.
Throughout this chapter I will lay out the general structure of the argument, 
without veering off into abstraction, for orienting ourselves in our lives.  Based on this 
structure I will comment on how this form of orientation-supplying-meaning-and-
fulfillment fits into the just society and how it offers a way to personal fulfillment that is 
an alternative to particular frameworks.
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Chapter One
Embedding the Question of Orientation:
Orientation, Justice, and Particular Frameworks
When we speak of orientation we must specify the domain within which one 
seeks orientation to ensure that we are not speaking past one another.  If I begin speaking 
of orientation and you think that I am discussing the concept in relation to navigating a 
ship, but I am really discussing it in relation to our daily lives, we would find ourselves in 
a confused muddle.  The goal of this section is to trace part of the history of two different 
philosophers dealing with the concept of orientation in hopes of finding an appropriate 
conception of it to apply to individuals in daily life.  My claim is that it is not obvious 
how one orients oneself in life.  What are we to orient ourselves to?  The vague notion of 
the good or the good life is not helpful until it has been fleshed out.  I am not going to 
start off by characterizing the good life and then go on to describe how to we steer 
ourselves to it; rather, I am going to begin by investigating the way in which we are 
capable of steering ourselves, in hopes of finding an appropriate one (Section One), then I 
am going to set up the boundaries within which this orienting can take place (Section 
Two), and, finally, I am going to contrast the model I have begun to draw with Charles 
Taylor’s notion of particular orientations applied to individuals and their lives (Section 
Three).  All of this falls under the heading of embedding the question of orientation.
Section One. Orientation in Space:  From Kant to Heidegger
I begin my discussion of orientation with the notion of orientation in space.  I 
begin here because space is the most basic of “places” within which individuals can be 
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oriented.  Analyzing different conceptions of orientation in space will also help lead us to 
an appropriate understanding of what daily life is embedded in.  An appropriate 
understanding of space combined with an adequate understanding of orientation in it, is 
the most basic step in discovering orientation within our daily lives and as such will serve 
as the foundation for any conception of orientation. Whether or not this notion of 
orientation will be recommended for the way in which individuals should be oriented in 
their daily lives has not been decided.  What is clear is that individuals must be oriented 
within space to simply move about intelligently; therefore, this is where I will begin.  
In Immanuel Kant’s essay “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” we 
are presented with a conception of how one orients oneself in space. 8  Kant suggests that 
to orient “oneself in any given space [is to orient oneself] mathematically.”9  Kant gives 
the following two examples to illustrate this type of orientation:
In the dark I orient myself in a room that is familiar to me if I can take hold of 
even one single object whose position I remember.  But it is plain that nothing 
helps me here except the faculty for determining position according to a 
subjective ground of differentiation: for I do not see at all the objects whose place 
I am to find; and if someone as a joke had moved all the objects around so that 
what was previously on the right was now on the left, I would be quite unable to 
find anything in a room whose walls were otherwise wholly identical.  But I can 
soon orient myself through the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides, 
the right and left. That is just what happens if I am to walk and take the correct 
turns on streets otherwise familiar to me when I cannot right now distinguish any 
of the houses.10
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In Kant’s first example, it seems as if he is saying that if I entered a familiar room 
with the lights off and I was spun around such that I didn’t know my original location all 
I needed to do for orientation would be to stumble into a piece of furniture I recognized 
by memory (determine which piece it is by feeling it out I suppose) and then allow my 
ability to feel a difference between left and right, a “faculty implanted by nature [and] 
made habitual through frequent practice,” to guide me through the rest of the room, since 
I know the general layout of the room (or its contents) from memory. 11  His main claim is 
that without the feeling that arises within us that differentiates left from right, we could 
locate and recognize a piece of familiar furniture in the room, but then we would not be 
capable of knowing which direction to move to get to the next piece of furniture that, 
from memory, we know is some distance from this original piece.  We would be helpless 
at that point without the feeling because nothing in the world indicates left or right; we 
supply that information.  Our subjective perspective adds directionality to the world. 
Consider a ball spinning freely in space.  Any objective view, any view that did not posit 
a specific perceiver, could not qualify the direction of the spin as clockwise or counter 
clockwise.  Only in relation to a subjective observer do we add this directionality to the 
world.  Kant’s conception of orientation concludes that orientation within any given 
space requires the ability to locate a recognizable position and then follow or listen to the 
feeling that arises within us that allows us to differentiate left from right.    
But, in his analysis, Kant emphasizes only the latter aspect of orientation, the 
feeling of differentiating left from right, as being fundamental or most constitutive of 
discovering orientation.  He gives this faculty of differentiation more credence with 
respect to orientation than he does our ability to locate our position or have a position at 
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all.  In essence, he is calling orientation the order of the world as perceived by any given 
subject in any given space.   His second example makes his priorities a little clearer.  If 
you knew you walked four blocks north and two blocks east from your house, but 
happened to look around you and realized nothing looked familiar, you need not be 
disoriented.  As long as you knew your position (4 blocks N, 2 blocks E of house) then, 
when you came to the unfamiliar intersection that you knew you needed to turn south 
onto, you would not have lost orientation.  But in Kant’s construal he only states 
emphatically that what is required here is “the mere feeling of a difference between my 
two sides,” and the idea of position has been entirely abstracted from any actual position 
this walker might have.  Again, in his construal of orientation he is emphasizing our 
ability to direct ourselves within any given space and not emphasizing our ability to 
recognize our position in it.  This sense of orientation does not account for much.  At best 
it seems to protect us from some barely fathomable, complete disorientation that would 
make knowing how to proceed in the world impossible.  But even this seemingly 
contentless notion of orientation requires at least some concrete aspect of the world to get 
off the ground.   
Kant doesn’t seem to appropriately account for our ability to ‘locate’ ourselves in 
space, or determine our position.  Martin Heidegger complains about Kant’s construal of 
orientation stating, “That I am already in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility 
of orientation than is the feeling for right and left.”12  This suggests that location and 
directionality are either equally constitutive, or that recognizing the fact that “I am 
already in a world” is more constitutive.  For Heidegger, directionality is a product of 
being-in-the-world: directionality is a mode of existence.  In response to Kant he writes, 
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“The subject with a ‘mere feeling’ of this difference [between left and right] is a 
construct posited in disregard of the state that is truly constitutive for any subject – 
namely, that whenever [a subject] has such a ‘mere feeling’, it is in a world already and 
must be in it to be able to orient itself at all.”13  What is most constitutive with respect to 
orientation then is this notion of being-in-the-world.  Even Kant, in his construal of 
orientation cannot explain orientation without hinting at this fact.  But his analysis does 
not adequately emphasize its importance as I have noted above.  Heidegger’s notion of 
orienting oneself from the standpoint of being-in-the-world deals more coherently and 
substantially with the concept of orientation than Kant’s notion of “orienting oneself in 
any given space,” which ultimately means orienting oneself in an abstract, non-actual 
space.
What Kant provides for us is an abstract understanding of orientation.  “Any 
space” refers to an abstract, universal understanding of space that would be appropriate 
for mathematical or scientific inquiry (as he notes).  And, although this conception of 
orientation (along with proper emphasis given to our ability to locate our position with 
respect to our destination) would be successful if employed in situations that required 
abstract orientation, our success would be measured only by our ability to maneuver from 
one abstract point to another.  The problem with this is that we never live entirely in 
abstract space.  Even our discussion of orientation with respect to abstract space needs to 
be grounded, for it to be coherent, by a piece of concrete reality.  In Kant’s case it is the 
piece of furniture that we first bump into.  This piece of concrete reality gives us our 
position.  But Kant devalues this part of the analysis because he is taking as given the 
notion of abstract or empty space and building his argument from that foundation.  From 
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the assumption of empty space it makes sense to deduce the need for a subjective 
understanding of imposed orientation.  But, once we realize that the analysis always 
requires a concrete context, our argument must be re-assessed.  What gets lost in Kant’s 
account is recovered in Heidegger’s.  Heidegger rejects Kant’s abstract notion of 
orientation and grounds the analysis of orientation in a way that brings our context to the 
fore.  
Abstract thought derives from the things and contexts we find ourselves in.  These 
things and contexts are not abstract; they are the concrete entities that our lives are 
organized around and with.  Heidegger wants to avoid an abstract notion of space (which 
in places he calls physical-technological or world space) and wants to discuss orientation 
in the space that we actually encounter in the world.  The difference between Kant’s 
notion of space and Heidegger’s notion of space can be understood as the difference 
between a scientific (mathematical) understanding of space and a phenomenological 
understanding of space.  Kant’s notion should not be thrown away and replaced by 
Heidegger’s:  the different methods of analysis render two different conceptions of 
orientation that apply to two different domains of inquiry.  Since our concern is with 
daily life and how one orients oneself in daily living, we are concerned with the context 
within which such happenings take place:  this is not the abstract realm of mathematical 
contemplation.  We do not come to the world and divide it into three dimensions, map a 
coordinate system on to it, layering it with an abstraction that distances us from it, and 
then attempt to orient ourselves to it.  Or, at least, our richest and deepest connections to 
the world and people do not happen when we operate this way.  When we incorporate 
technology into our lives we actually do begin to exist in both abstract and concrete 
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space.  The sense in which I am using the term ‘technology’ is the Borgmannian notion 
of a device that procures a commodity.14 A device is a piece of technology whose internal 
workings or presence in our lives is hidden from us visually and nearly inaccessible in 
our understanding and interactions if exposed.  What the device procures for us is a 
commodity that delivers pleasure or a thing of necessity.  In a world stripped bare of 
technology we would be forced to live and engage directly with the world as it is to get 
what we needed or wanted out of it.  As we incorporate technology in our lives that 
removes us from this engagement, the space we exist in becomes a layered space on top 
of, or an abstracted space above, concrete space.  The difference can be articulated by 
considering a technological device that does approximate abstract space and extracts us 
from the landmarks and particularities of concrete space.  
Consider the global positioning system (GPS) devices that are now employed in 
automobiles.  Instead of paying attention to the physical landmarks outside of the vehicle, 
the driver orients herself using a screen that updates itself continuously while the car 
moves towards its destination.  One’s powers of observation and interpretation are 
replaced with a GPS output-solution to whatever destination is requested.  Our 
participation is not with the signs and landscapes we can see through the windshield. 
Now we are told where to turn and when to turn, and it only requires lining up the 
command with what actually exists, or how the road actually turns.  Like the Kantian 
subject, orientation emanates from the GPS device.  The difficulty with accepting this 
type of orientation as the one that should be incorporated into our lives is that it does not 
answer the call of orientation.  To be oriented is to be oriented to something.  When we 
consider the Kantian notion of orientation or the accepted cultural instantiation of 
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orientation delivered by the GPS device, this something becomes arbitrary:  I am oriented 
when I know where I am relative to any other given point.  But just because one has her 
bearings, does not mean she is oriented.  To claim that one is oriented we must work out 
what we should be oriented to and how we are to be oriented to it.  Kant attempts to 
answer the second part of this question.  Contemporary culture claims to leave it open to 
the individual without recognizing the strong forces that influence the individual to 
actually be oriented in a specific direction.  Heidegger attempts to answer the first part of 
the question which, in turn, deduces an answer for the second part.  From him we shall 
take our cue. 
In the example of the GPS, concrete space has not disappeared.  It has become the 
backdrop onto which abstract, technological space projects itself.  The GPS screen 
flattens space and projects what it determines to be important for the driver to pay 
attention to.  Here we begin to lose the depth of reality.  We begin to strip our lives of 
what reality actually presents to us behind technology, and we lose what Heidegger calls 
our life’s “involvement-character.”15   From this point I believe that we can begin to draw 
the moral reasons for demanding a concrete assessment of space in our hopes of 
discovering orientation in which we can live a rich, “involved” life in relation to things of 
concern, rather than accepting an abstract notion of space in which orientation is an 
arbitrary matter.
Let us call this move away from the abstract notion of orientation Heidegger’s 
call for concreteness.  Space and what we should be oriented to in space is discussed in 
his essays: “Art and Space,” “The Thing,” and “Building Dwelling Thinking.”  In each 
essay Heidegger suggests the move away from the “physically-technologically projected 
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space” to a less abstract, more appropriate understanding of space and orientation that 
treats distances (remote or close) and directionality (left, right, up, down, etc.) as 
qualities, not of measurable, quantifiable nature, but as the way in which we as thinking 
subjects bring things close to or near to us in our dealings. 16  As I type, what is closest to 
me are the black letters that appear on the screen and their relationship to the train of 
thought I am working on.  This distance is determined by what I am focused on and what 
is currently of most importance to me, and what I am currently working on or engaged 
with; it by no means is what is physically closest to me.  To determine what is physically-
technologically closest to me, one must determine my position (which in itself is not 
simple: am I my body or a part of my body or just a current perception of my position?) 
and then begin to measure out from that point listing everything that is encountered. 
Between ‘me’ and the screen one would encounter the air that brushes against my face, 
my clothes, the seat that I rest on, and my hands on the key board.  There would be 
nothing in that measurement that would single out what it is that we should be orienting 
ourselves to: we would just be given a list of facts for which some other guide would 
have to be employed to make a decision.  And this is our concern.  What guides us to 
bring one thing and not another close to us when we discover the different possible ways 
in which our attention, work, and involvement can be employed?  We can say that 
Heidegger has established the notion of orientation we would like to adopt for how we 
orient ourselves in our daily lives, but the content of what we orient ourselves to is 
missing.
To this we will return.  But first we must work out the domain within which 
orientation in our daily lives should be placed.  We have begun to answer this by 
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choosing concrete space over abstract and technological space and adding to it the 
notions of closeness and involvement that relate to the possible ways in which an 
individual can be engrossed.  From this point orientation can be understood as a way in 
which we guide our decisions about what we focus our concern and involvement on and 
how we do so.  Before we can discuss this, though, we must secure something that is 
implicit in and precedes the discussion of the good life.
Section Two.  Justice:  The horizon for ways of living
Before we attempt to deploy the concept of orientation that we have begun to 
establish, we must set up the boundaries within which we are to deploy it.  So far we have 
limited it to concrete space.  What this implies is that any theorizing we do in relation to 
how our daily lives should be structured must be capable of impacting how we actually 
live our lives.  To clarify this point, consider how when reading the Frankfurt School 
philosophers, we feel that they have an interest in daily living to the extent that they 
critique the current political structure in hopes of improving it for the sake of the people, 
but all we get is a critique of the current instantiations of oppression. 17  What is lacking is 
the positive side of a negative analysis or critique.  Once the current situation has been 
readily critiqued, what are we to do?  The critical theorists don’t provide an answer here. 
At times it seems as though the only thing we can do is endlessly critique the situation we 
find ourselves in.  And, although this may be prudent and a path towards truth, it misses 
the fact that we are all engaged in daily living – even critical theorists.  They must 
participate in that which they are critiquing in a way that provides sustenance to survive, 
and they must attempt to build a good life.  Instead of ignoring this feature of our lives 
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we must philosophize about it.  Therefore, our investigations cannot be merely a critique, 
and they must relate to the concrete ways of life that are possible for us.           
But the critical theorists are right to critique the political structures that over and 
over again are built upon oppressive ways of thinking or when in the hands of 
irresponsible individuals lead to corrupt nations.  For our concerns, the political realm is 
of crucial concern because it lays out the horizons for the permissible ways of life for 
individuals.  I believe the next most basic realm (after space) in which daily life is, and 
should be, embedded in is the political realm.  
Some may object here and suggest that requiring an individual to recognize the 
political structure that does or can rule over one’s choices only impinges upon the 
possibility for the good life.  But I disagree. We should opt to embrace a political 
structure instead of rejecting it in hopes of independently securing for ourselves freedom 
for the good life.  We should do so for two very different reasons.  The first comes from 
Aristotle.  Aristotle argues that, by nature, we are social creatures.18  In order to 
experience or engage in certain activities that offer an individual a sense of happiness or 
accomplishment or fulfillment, the social realm must exist.  In other words, if a human is 
deprived of the condition of togetherness or the sense of participation that can be found in 
a social setting, the upper bound for the possibility of happiness or fulfillment that one 
could achieve would be lower than for one who was afforded such a setting.  The second 
reason can be understood in terms of security and can be understood in two senses.  In the 
negative sense, ways of life in society are considered acceptable up to the extent that they 
don’t infringe upon the security of others, where security refers to bodily integrity and 
inalienable personal freedoms and rights.  In the positive sense, an abstract or 
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metaphorical space has been cleared within which I am permitted to engage in a way of 
life.  Here, law and the coercive power of the government would uphold these agreed 
upon or stipulated boundaries.  This is not so much a physical space as it is a space of 
possibility limited by the conditions put forth by the political realm.
Before sketching the landscape of the political realm, I must follow up the 
previous discussion with an additional note.  I have an affinity for those who believe that 
we are required to reject the impositions and boundaries that have been placed upon 
individuals simply because they are involuntarily born into a given society governed by a 
certain politic.  A lot of the talk of the “good life” is found in the writings of those who 
reject society and attempt to find their own way or live off the land.  In these cases I think 
the spirit of rejection is warranted, but the expression of it is misguided.  Here I am 
thinking of the American transcendentalists, the rise of the Hippies in 1960’s America, 
and the Amish communities still present in America.  The impulse behind the ways of life 
supported by these ways of thought need not reject society in its entirety.  One’s 
relationship with nature, one’s care-free, pacifist concerns, or one’s rejection of modern 
amenities all have elements that should be incorporated into the possible ways of life 
found in society.  The rejection of society found in similar movements should be 
redirected in a way that doesn’t reject social structure in its entirety, but, rather, enters 
into discourse with society in the hopes that society will respond to the ways of life and 
values expressed.  But for the second reason stated above there should be limits to what 
activities are permissible.  
As a way into a discussion of the political realm let us consider what permissible 
might mean.  This notion of permissible should not be understood with parental 
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connotations.  The limits and boundaries of what is permissible in society come from a 
reasonable person rationally considering their situation and making a choice about which 
activities are in fact compatible with the situation: one isn’t commanded to do something, 
but would agree to doing so if he or she could see the issue clearly.  
One way of approaching this question of determining the boundaries established 
by the political realm is to come to terms with them in ideal theory.  If one were to do 
this, they would be creating the target that we should strive for in terms of the way in 
which our social institutions function.  In a sense, this theory could be part of what we 
orient ourselves to in the question concerning orientation in our daily lives:  it will set up 
the boundaries within which our lives are embedded, and, in a democracy, put forth an 
activity that is part of ensuring the possibility of the good life: political participation.  
John Rawls, in Justice as Fairness, attempts to set these boundaries by laying out 
the principles that would ensure justice in a democracy of free and equal citizens. 19 
Following Kant, he writes: 
The idea is that it belongs to reason and reflection (both theoretical and practical) 
to orient us in the (conceptual) space, say, of all possible ends, individual and 
associational, political and social.  Political philosophy, as a work of reason, does 
this by specifying principles to identify reasonable and rational ends of those 
various kinds, and by showing how those ends can cohere within a well-
articulated conception of a just and reasonable society.  Such a conception may 
offer a unified framework within which proposed answers to divisive questions 
can be made consistent and the insights gained from different kinds of cases can 
be brought to bear on one another and extended to other cases.20
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Rawls’ project, unlike ours, has committed itself to the domain of the political.  It doesn’t 
ignore the realm of everyday living, and it doesn’t treat it as inferior.  Rawls’ project, in a 
sense, leaves the question of the structure and content of daily life open.  Importantly, 
what Rawls attempts to do is secure the possibility of a good life for all.  His theory is 
guided, not by describing or conceptualizing about the nature and content of the good 
life, but, rather, by the requirement that all should be able to aim at such a target.  In 
terms of priority, Rawls describes the political realm as follows:
…just institutions and the political virtues would serve no purpose - would have 
no point - unless those institutions and virtues not only permitted but also 
sustained conceptions of the good…that citizens can affirm as worth of their full 
allegiance.  A conception of political justice must contain within itself sufficient 
space, as it were, for ways of life that can gain devoted support.  If it cannot do 
this, that conception will lack support and be unstable.  In a phrase, the just draws 
the limit, the good shows the point.21    
The need for a limit is the same as saying the need for justice or the need to have society 
set up in such a way that it allows everyone to at least have an equal opportunity to aim at 
and move towards the good life.  If the hindrances upon movement towards all ways of 
life that can aim at some good arise from the basic structure of the political or social 
institutions that one is embedded in, then political justice, although it may have been 
secured, is pointless.  From another angle, if a collection of peoples’ lives are good at the 
expense of another group of people, justice has not yet been secured. 
But more importantly, the notion of justice as fairness is a political conception of 
justice.  Rawls’ theory comes up with principles of justice that are effective when applied 
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to the choice between different conceptions of political regimes or basic structures or 
systems of government.  What this means is that when we follow Rawls as a guide and 
consider “the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation” 
consisting of free and equal citizens with respect to their political status, we can then 
consider different systems of government and adopt one that functions in such a way that 
it can follow the principles of justice deduced from this conception of society. 22  These 
principles in turn become the guide for the institutions that constitute the structure of our 
society.  The principles do not necessarily govern all of our actions; we aren’t required to 
apply the political conception of justice to every aspect of our lives, but our ways of life 
are most certainly limited by this background feature.
What this means is that our notions of the good, all notions of the good, are 
subordinated to the notion of justice. This brings us to the following question:  Why is 
Rawls proposing what he calls a “free-standing” theory of justice that applies to the 
political realm instead of proposing a moral theory that is comprehensive enough to cover 
both the political conception of justice and the notion of the good that governs, not only 
the institutions of society, but the lives that individuals lead?  
In response to this, Rawls writes “that, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, a 
well-ordered society in which all its members accept the same comprehensive doctrine is 
impossible.”23  Reasonable pluralism, continues Rawls, “is the fact that a diversity of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines is a permanent feature of a democratic society.”24 
Comprehensive doctrines are what make conceptions of the good coherent and are 
usually philosophical or theological doctrines.  Rawls is suggesting that within society 
different conceptions of the good can exist if they are reasonable and recognize the 
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restrictions imposed by and the role required of individuals cooperating within society 
(implicitly, the rules of justice as fairness).  Having said that, Rawls doesn’t want to drop 
another comprehensive doctrine in the bucket; he wants to look at the fundamental 
concept of democratic society and deduce the principles that can help create and maintain 
a fair and cooperate society.  Rawls, by focusing on the political realm, helps set up the 
background within which conceptions of the good life (made coherent by comprehensive 
doctrines) frame individuals’ lives, but he doesn’t offer a sufficient answer to the 
character of and orientation in daily life.  This is not so much a fault as it is a matter of 
scope.  Rawls’ theory provides an essential, necessary part of the answer to our 
investigation.  And, Rawls offers us a way into the question of daily life by laying out a 
basic condition for it and suggesting a way to proceed to it.  What is of concern is how he 
leaves the question of the good life open.  
Thinking that it is possible to leave a space open in society or culture for 
individuals to fill with “a plan of life in the light of which they schedule their more 
important endeavors and allocate their various resources so as rationally to pursue their 
conceptions of the good over a complete life” is perhaps too ideal. 25  That which 
structures and gives content to our daily lives goes beyond a just political system because 
there are other issues related to our lives that are strongly conducive to a particular way 
of life, and they fail to be debated, public, and open to effective criticism.  When we put 
the good life in the hands of these inducements, the defensive attitude of “I can do 
whatever I want” is actually reinforced by what Rawls proposes, even though Rawls 
would respond by saying that it is not in your best interest to do what you think you have 
freely chosen.   And although some individuals may be courageous and disciplined 
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enough to proceed with the rational pursuit of a commendable notion of the good life, the 
currents and forces of contemporary culture instantiated by the appeal of consumerism, 
the power of technology, and people’s lack of substantial notions of the good life are too 
great, or too seductive, or too disorienting to overcome by most.   
Orientation to the good life at the level of the individual is given a more 
substantial treatment in the work of Charles Taylor.  He suggests that one discovers, in 
the process of coming to terms with one’s identity, a particular framework that represents 
answers to important evaluative questions about how one’s life is led.  This notion 
corresponds to what Rawls calls a comprehensive doctrine.  Taylor attempts to explicate 
the conditions for the possibility of the good life (through the notion of identity as a 
moral concept) by examining the requirements needed for an individual to have a 
meaningful, rich life.  I will now consider this approach to see how the notion of 
particular frameworks fits into the domain within which we are seeking orientation.
Section Three.  Particular Frameworks
The essay in which Kant discusses orientation begins by analyzing how one is 
oriented in space.  The essay goes on to discuss how one can be oriented in both 
theoretical and practical thinking.  The realm in which Kant discusses the employment of 
practical reason can be understood as moral space.  In Kant’s moral space we are to 
follow, and be oriented by, the moral law “which is of itself apodictically certain.”26 
Although this will steer us correctly, Kant suggests it doesn’t lay out the landscape in 
full.  Reason supplies us with the ‘what’ to do (follow the moral law), but only through 
“rational belief or faith” does the full picture of why we do so come into resolution. 27 
23
This is the subjective element needed to provide orientation in moral space.  Just as in his 
analysis of orientation in physical space, in moral space we are guided by a subjective 
feeling.  This feeling is not any random feeling or flash of enthusiasm.  The feeling that 
provides orientation and a rational belief beyond that which one can know is a feeling 
that leads to a concept that can satisfy the “need of reason.”28  Describing this feeling 
Kant writes:  “Reason does not feel; it has insight into its lack and through the drive for 
cognition it effects the feeling of a need.  It is the same way with moral feeling, which 
does not cause any moral law, for this arises wholly from reason; rather, it is caused or 
effected by moral laws, hence by reason, because the active yet free will needs 
determinate grounds.”29    
Again, we find ourselves in an abstract realm where reason lays out the landscape. 
From the short paragraph above we can imagine that the moral law has no connection to 
any specific culture, is not bound to any actual space or time, and it can apply to any 
person in any place at any time.  In terms of scope this is an amazing feat of generality. 
In terms of depth and richness in what it prescribes it is desolate and thin.  Kant’s 
analysis concludes by positing an intelligent creator of the world “in order to give 
objective reality to the concept of the highest good” in the hope that this will prevent his 
moral philosophy from being construed as idealism. 30 (This is also what fulfills the felt 
need of reason.)  The moral law he prescribes is not justified by God; rather, God fills out 
the landscape of the moral space entailed by the realm, depicted by reason, in which the 
drama of life is played out.  By this point, Kant’s analysis of moral space has risen above 
physical space and rests somewhere over it and is only in touch with it through its 
trappings.  The abstract realm created by reason doesn’t admit the personal complexities 
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of an individual, the particular life defined by one’s context, or one’s emotions and goals. 
For Kant these are to be bracketed and our practical action should conform to the 
universal law, otherwise it is deviant.  The problem with this is that it doesn’t account for 
the possibility of happiness in our earthly lives.  The problem of “what we should do,” or 
attending to the broader sense of morality that includes what things are worth doing and 
the content of the good life, requires an answer that suggests some fulfillment within 
those actual lives.  By using the notion of “fulfillment” I am adding the sense of 
fulfillment that can be understood as happiness.  It has more than the one dimension of 
reason.  There is an emotional, contextual, and a dimension of particularity that gives 
happiness its content.
In the same way that Heidegger is the counterpoint to Kant’s understanding of 
physical space, Charles Taylor can be understood as Kant’s counterpoint to moral space. 
Taylor suggests a move to concreteness in how moral space is construed.  In doing so he 
attends to the multidimensional nature of what it means to be an individual pursuing 
happiness, fulfillment, and meaning.  He begins discussing orientation by way of 
analogy.  First he describes the need for orientation in physical space and then links that 
to moral space:
Our orientation in space is not the answer to a factitious, dispensable issue.  We 
couldn’t conceive of a human life form where one day people came to reflect that, 
since they were spatial beings, they ought after all to develop a sense of up and 
down, right and left, and find landmarks which would enable them to get around
—reflections which might be disputed by others.  We can’t conceive of a form in which 
this question is not always already there, demanding an answer.  We can’t 
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distance ourselves from the issue of spatial orientation or fail to stumble upon it…or 
repudiate it.31
This excerpt is from an argument in which Taylor is denying the possibility that we could 
exist somehow without an orientation in space.  He then uses this to serve his concern 
about orientation in the realm of moral space. ‘Moral space,’ as described by Taylor, 
refers to “a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing 
and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and 
secondary.”32  Compared to Kant, Taylor’s construal of moral space is broader and richer. 
We are offered more dimensions to be engaged morally in the world than simply 
fulfilling some duty posited by an abstract law.  He offers us a notion of what it may 
mean to live a good life that goes beyond meeting an obligation.  This in itself helps 
satisfy our intuition that a good life is in some way earthly and rewarded as having a 
sense of positive feelings, happiness, fulfillment, and meaning - all of which are part of 
the concept of joy. 
Taylor claims that the demand for orientation in moral space, like that of physical 
space, is also “always and already there.”  Within this moral space one is oriented by 
knowing where one stands with respect to the questions that arise there, and this in turn 
establishes one’s identity.  Taylor writes that our identity is defined through “an 
understanding of what is of crucial importance to us.”33  An identity, or a coherent 
collection of answers to the questions that arise in moral space, make up what Taylor 
calls a framework.  
These frameworks pertain to groups of individuals by means of their upbringing. 
Taylor discusses the source of frameworks as coming from interlocutor or language 
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communities which produce individuals with the capacity to have frameworks at all.  The 
necessity for a language and language partners such that one can be confronted by and 
come up with answers to the questions that arise in concrete moral space requires 
learning a language, which in turn requires language partners.  And, any deviation from 
the frameworks that are held by an individual’s original language partners is always a 
deviation from the original, never a conquering of it.  Defining oneself always involves, 
in part, a person’s ability to show his or her tie to some language-forming community. 
Taylor states that an individual can only define himself by “his stand on moral and 
spiritual matters…[and] some reference to a defining community.”34  Both of these 
elements make up a person’s framework or identity.  
Frameworks function in the following way.  First, imagine a framework from the 
past.  Taylor describes the honor ethic held by citizens and soldiers.  Here an individual 
would be born into a certain community where he or she would learn the language which 
would make it possible to answer in evaluative language about where he or she stands on 
issues of importance.  In the framework of the honor ethic, statements such as “Never 
retreat in battle” or “Do not question the King” may have been lived by.  These 
statements in relation to their referents would have helped established the horizon of 
meaning for an individual by being what Taylor calls strong evaluations or qualitative 
distinctions.  To clarify this, the statements can be translated to read “It is bad to retreat in 
battle” or “It is wrong to question the King”.  These statements come as part of the 
frameworks that are inherited from the communities these individuals are born into. 
Their authenticity or justification is not found in an analysis of the principles or the 
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foundations upon which they rest.  Rather, they are found by actually importing a sense 
of meaning into the individual’s life.   
From this we can begin to get the complete picture of a person’s life and the 
meaning that can be attached to it.  If one was born into a culture that followed the honor 
ethic and adopted it himself, his life would be meaningful such that he had the 
opportunity to engage in the activities that could fulfill commands similar to one’s listed 
above and that he fulfilled them successfully.  Not having the opportunity to engage in 
battle or service to the King (when the meaning of life is to do exactly that) could render 
one’s life unfulfilled.  Perhaps worse, having the opportunity to fight or serve and failing 
at the task could render one’s life a failure. (Remember, failure is based upon the strong 
evaluations found in statements similar to the ones discussed above and outline the 
framework of an individual’s life.)
What is clear from this is that the idea of a framework gives us the content to 
discuss the notions of a ‘fulfilled or unfulfilled’ and ‘successful or failed’ life in a 
meaningful way.  This is part of our concern with respect to orientation:  what it means to 
be oriented in our lives is to be orientated to the possibility of fulfillment.  Fulfillment or 
the sense of being on the path to fulfillment is, in a sense, a result of correct orientation. 
The idea of correct orientation must be explored further, but first we should decide 
whether or not to move forward in accepting frameworks as the means by which to find 
orientation.  
We must start at the beginning again to see the difficulties of adopting particular 
frameworks for our inquiry into orientation.  We started off by circumscribing the domain 
within which orientation was to be sought.  First, we found our way to concrete space, 
28
which dispelled the myth that we could live (in the sense of actively participate with the 
world and the beings and things in it) by means of orientation to an abstract or 
mathematical space.  Second, we made a stipulation.  We claimed that we should opt for 
social engagement if we wanted to secure the richest possibility for the good life. 
Importantly, we didn’t adopt a specific political agenda, but, rather, we adopted a 
criterion for any instantiation of political power that may come about.  This criterion was 
described as justice as fairness and was taken from Rawls.  
These two elements have begun to create the boundaries of the landscape within 
which we will seek orientation to the good life.  Next, we showed that there are concerns 
about claiming to leave the space for the good life open.  Attempting to come up with a 
principle to follow or a way to flesh out this space, we introduced the concept of moral 
space.  We rejected the abstract notion of moral space as construed by Kant and 
considered Taylor’s more concrete moral frameworks.  Now the difficulty with the notion 
of frameworks, as I see them, is that, although they offer a more concrete construal of 
moral space than the one offered by Kant, they don’t go far enough.  First, they stand 
over and against the circumscribed area established by justice.  Our culture does not 
produce one single framework that is adopted by everyone.  Individuals, even when 
focusing solely on a single nation such as America, come out of a myriad of different 
language communities that value different things in different ways.  Speaking of the 
different types of frameworks that arise in the modern world Taylor writes, “None forms 
the horizon of the whole society in the modern West…no framework is shared by 
everyone.”35  Since this is the case, we must consider the consequences of clashing 
frameworks.  Due to the improbability of different value systems seamlessly overlapping, 
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conflict will arise.  Some of this conflict could be understood as a difference in the 
understanding of rights.  The right to engage in some practices but not others doesn’t 
come out of a framework in the way that Taylor describes it.  There is something 
overarching all frameworks or something similar to all frameworks that helps us 
determine which practices will be tolerated when a conflict arises.  But this has already 
been determined once we rationally consider our situation as being members of a society 
that accepts the criterion of justice.  The practices that are permissible are the ones that 
are just.  The ones that must be eliminated are the ones that are not just.  This will 
eliminate the possibility for the fulfillment of at least some frameworks that exist in 
society.   It may not eliminate the framework entirely, but it will truncate it or take away 
from it in such a way that its capacity for acting as the horizon of meaning for an 
individual or community will be altered.  In fact, this draws a more realistic picture of 
modern society than imagining that our world is made up of a bunch of communities on 
the path to fulfillment by means of different frameworks.  The loss of meaning in 
peoples’ lives that is a signature mark of modernity -one discussed by Taylor- could be 
attributed, not just to the skepticism about frameworks (an incorrect understanding of 
identity that Taylor argues against), but to the fact that frameworks aren’t sufficient for 
orientation to the good life in society.  Because of this, it seems prudent, for my project, 
to work from the basis of justice to the ways of life that are possible to be oriented to in 
hopes of seeking fulfillment within the bounds of a just society.
Taylor himself describes the condition where a legitimate framework is in place to 
offer an individual an orientation to the good life, yet is prevented from doing so by the 
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values embedded in an unjust society.  (By ‘legitimate framework’ I mean one that offers 
the guidance to, or horizons for, life-fulfillment and fits within a just society.)  
Someone who sees the fulfillment of life in some form of expressive activity may 
be far from this fulfillment, but she may nevertheless see herself as striving 
towards it and approaching it, even though she never fully encompasses what she 
projects for herself.  Of course, in this case, the issue may concern not only her 
basic stance…but the objective limits of possibility which frame her life.  People 
bent on an artistic career may feel they have it in them to do something 
significant; or alternatively, they may come to feel one day that they just haven’t 
got what it takes.  Or their despair may spring from a sense that some external 
limitations stand in the way: that people of their class, or race, or sex , or poverty 
will never be allowed to develop themselves in the relevant ways.  Many women 
in our day have felt so excluded from careers, which they saw as deeply fulfilling 
(for a whole host of reasons, to do with recognition as well as with expression and 
the significant achievements for human welfare that these jobs entailed), by 
external barriers which had nothing to do with their own authentic desires and 
attitudes.36 
It is the concern of justice that legitimate ways of life are not denied to individuals for 
reasons of gender, race, or economic status.37  This works in both directions: legitimate 
ways of life are not to be denied and ways of life that take advantage of people through 
unjust means must be rejected in our contemplation of the good life. Justice must be 
secured and the possibility for a meaningful life must fit within this “framework of 
justice,” so that a meaningful life as a framework will slide in place within it.  Taylor 
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fails to recognize how this space for the good life has been set by the framework of 
justice.  The constraints of contemporary culture must be worked out before we can claim 
that particular frameworks related to individuals fulfill the need for orientation by 
providing the content and structure of our daily lives.      
All of this seems to be saying something very obvious, but it is crucial that it is 
laid out in this manner such that we approach the question of orientation in the correct 
way.  In the end, I think something like the notion of frameworks will still be a 
“legitimate moral description,” but because of the need for justice in our investigation 
into how to gain orientation to the good life, we must bracket the notion of frameworks 
until we can lay out, in a principled manner, what about them allows them to offer 
fulfillment or meaning, fit within a just society, and address the constraints of our 
contemporary culture. 38
The space in society opened up by justice is where the possibility for the good life 
will be realized.  It is not an empty space however.  It has pervasive cultural constraints 
and opportunities built into it that must be charted and taken responsibility for.  In his 
presentation of particular frameworks, Taylor doesn’t entertain the question of how his 
frameworks might fit into this space of justice and culture, and this leads us to the 
concern described in the example above.  Even though Taylor makes a move away from 
the abstract towards the concrete, he doesn’t move far enough away.  The details of how 
the practices that are taken up within certain frameworks that fit in the space opened up 
by justice are to be reconciled with the constraints found in contemporary culture is the 
groundwork that needs to be done to build the foundation for the good life.  
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Instead of approaching the question of the good life by identifying and living up 
to the particular framework one seems to be affiliated with, we should approach the 
question by examining the possibilities for practices that can constitute the good life in 
the concrete.  To do this I suggest that we turn away from philosophical or political 
theorizing and look at narrative.  We won’t turn our backs on theory; we just need a new 
source that can provide the content for the practices that can make up the good life while 
registering the constraints of contemporary culture that inform the landscape of the moral 
space in which the good life is possible.  In turning to narrative, we will be working from 




Charting the Space for the Good Life
Introduction: Narrative as a Diagnostic Tool
I have rejected Charles Taylor’s notion of particular frameworks because they do 
not appropriately deal with the pervasive cultural constraints and opportunities in the 
space opened up by justice for the good life.  The next step towards orientation requires a 
mapping of this cultural space in order to come to terms with the forces and currents 
found within it.  To do this I propose looking at a narrative in its concrete portrayal of a 
life lived in a fictionalized, but reality-representing, American culture.  Of course no 
depiction of America could be confused with the depiction of a nation that has 
successfully adopted the criterion of justice, and therefore, in the narrative depicting 
American life, the space left for the content of the good life cannot stand as an accurate 
model for the space opened up in ideal theory.  But this is all to the better.  If we have the 
hope of living what can be deemed a good life today, we must come to terms with what 
this means in a nation that is striving for the ideal of justice, not simply an ideal one that 
has met that goal.  That being said, the content of the good life will be subordinate to the 
principles of justice, but provide an answer to the question of what makes justice 
worthwhile.  Instead of proposing that a particular framework fits into the space opened 
up by justice (Taylor) or that at least one comprehensive doctrine will fit into this space 
(Rawls), narrative can present the content required to show that the attempt to live a good 
life is actually a struggle to find meaning in a culture that is inclined towards cutting out 
the conditions for the possibility of frameworks, comprehensive doctrines, and 
ultimately, the good life.  Because of this, the philosophical work required to address the 
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question of the good life must attend to questions that are prior or more fundamental to 
concepts like particular frameworks and comprehensive doctrines; the work needs to be 
more concrete.   
Narrative, in contrast to theory, has the ability to present us with both the 
constraints of our culture and that which has the power to orient us.  It can be diagnostic 
as well as orienting.  Where a theory is conceptual in structure and shows how elements 
of the good life are linked together or how a certain form of orientation is coherent (Kant 
and Rawls), narrative has a time-elapsing structure and is by nature correspondent or 
resonant to our fears and hopes.  The structure of narrative gives it a unique appeal for the 
inquiry into the good life.  Our lives can be said to have a narrative structure or at least 
require the minimum of the intelligibility of a story to make them hang together as a 
whole.  So a narrative, in this sense, will help us figure out an ultimate structure or 
method with which we can apply meaning to our lives.
The bulk of Chapter 2 (Sections 1 and 2) will attempt to answer the first part of 
the question of orientation:  Where are we? and will be related to the diagnostic function 
of narrative.  The end of Chapter 2 (Section 3) will steer us to the task left for Chapter 3, 
answering the substantial concern about orientation:  Where should we be? and will be 
related to the link narrative has to that which has the power of orienting us.
The question, Where are we? is to be answered by pointing out the strong currents 
and forces that actually do structure our lives in contemporary culture.  This question 
cannot be answered by saying that people find meaning in their lives because they stay 
faithful to a particular framework as Taylor suggests.  The question has to be answered 
by looking at actual lives that can represent the way in which lives in our culture are 
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typically lived.  By looking at an actual life, the constraints and opportunities for and 
against the good life can be articulated simply by being pointed out: they will be 
concretely instantiated.  The concrete instantiation of a life against the background of 
what it means to live a life of significance or a good life can provide the philosophical 
orientation needed to respond to the question of the good life.  This supports the main 
thesis of my essay, namely, that orientation can be discovered between theory and 
narrative.  
For this presentation I will look at the actual lives of the fictional characters of 
America America.  I will explicate the constraints and opportunities of contemporary 
culture by relating the concrete instances found in the narrative to explanations of what it 
means to be engaged in living a good life articulated theoretically by Charles Taylor in 
The Ethics of Authenticity, and I will attempt to ground the explanation of how things can 
orient us with Martin Heidegger’s essay “Art and Space.”  
Section One.   A Great Loss
There are two distinct time periods in the novel that I wish to discuss:  the 
childhood of Corey Sifter which is marked by great hope and potential and the adulthood 
of Corey Sifter which is marked by the character of decency that is attached to a 
sentiment of great loss which carries with it a sense of fatalism.  
Corey’s childhood takes place within a rich context and is attached to 
engagements that offer a strong sense of meaning.  The Metarey estate, in upstate New 
York, on which he is employed and treated almost like a son, besides being a farm, is the 
center of the community he lives in.  He is given a position to work for and to be in direct 
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contact with Liam Metarey.  The recognition he gets from Mr. Metarey is of the most 
substantial nature:  Liam is the most respected person in the community due to his 
position of power and his democratic use of it.  The scope of meaning for the activities 
Corey is engaged in only became larger when he begins assisting in Senator Bonwiller’s 
campaign for presidency, which has its campaign headquarters on the Metarey estate.  It 
is the early seventies, and Corey is just finishing high school.  
Corey’s adulthood consists of his career of owning, publishing, and writing for 
the local paper; his family life; visiting his father; and recounting his past. 
What I want to highlight are the changes the culture goes through from Corey’s 
childhood to the time in which this story is being narrated.  I want to investigate the 
important claim Corey makes when in response to the destruction of the Metarey estate 
he says: “This is the fall of our culture, Dad.  This is the end of a way of life.”39  To do 
this I will look at the life of Corey-Sifter-the-narrator in his present life (the year is 2006) 
and compare it to his childhood and the world in which he lived with Mr. Metarey. 
Before I begin, I want to clarify that I don’t think the culture makes an epochal change in 
the 35 or so years between Corey’s childhood and his adulthood, but the character of the 
culture changes in degree; the forces behind the things that structure our lives do so in a 
way that renders our lives less meaningful, and the culture’s currents and disorienting 
forces become more powerful and overwhelming. 
In one sense this inquiry into orientation is an act of retrieval.  The momentum of 
my argument, from the beginning, comes from the fact that things from the past have the 
power to orient our lives.  This, of course, has its own problematic.  I must guard against 
nostalgia and extolling tradition for tradition’s sake.  I have to show that “the way 
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progress is” is not just the superseding of one culture by another and should be accepted 
as this because this is how history works. 40  I have to show that things and practices of 
significance are what make a culture and a life good and that the moral implications of 
“progress” must attend to this.
The first parallel between generations I wish to draw in America America that will 
make the comparison between the two time periods possible stands out sharply.  Both 
Liam and Corey take a member of the community under their wing.  Corey’s intern 
Trieste closely parallels Corey in his youth.  But these two differ in an important way.  In 
a moment of reflection Corey distinguishes a difference between the ambitions of the two 
generations: “These days, of course, I’m reminded of Trieste – although her resolve is in 
the form of vigorous originality, and ours, if I have to put a word on it, was in the form of 
hunger.”41  Although this difference may just be a difference in intellectual capacities, as 
Corey attempts to explain it, they are also differences of type.  These types are both 
related to the moral ideal of seeking fulfillment for oneself but do so in two different 
ways.  The attempt at originality requires some type of guidance; otherwise it is 
originality for originality’s sake and becomes problematic.  Hunger, although possibly 
unreflective, at least suggests that there is something worth being hungry for.  By looking 
closer at the difference between the two, we can get a grip on what the different attitudes 
require in practice and offer in terms of fulfillment.  Trieste is not a good example of 
someone who is thoroughly engaged in the practice of originality for originality’s sake, 
but this way of life is most clearly identified, in the novel, with her and her generation.  
We confront Trieste forging her own way in several instances and for different 
reasons, some possibly detrimental others harmless.  First, she rejects conforming to the 
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cultural norms of dress; she dresses like a boy.42  She extends this rejection further in her 
rejection of manufactured clothing.  In one scene, we see her wearing a plastic trash bag 
for a rain coat.43  Although creative, perfectly harmless, and possibly illuminating, these 
modes of rejection don’t suggest a way of life that can unfold into meaningful, fulfilling 
pursuits.  Her rejection of female attire illuminates the way we, in general, mindlessly 
conform to cultural norms that are gender-specific, but it doesn’t suggest a principled 
alternative way of life other than the option of the ironic, and as we will see this becomes 
problematic when applied to that which centers our lives.   Her rejection of manufactured 
clothing is problematic because it doesn’t deviate far enough from what is being rejected. 
Her alternative still rests heavily upon the technological infrastructure that makes it 
possible for us to have materials such as plastic bags.  If her rejection of manufactured 
clothing seeks to substitute that which is manufactured, it must go further than simply 
replacing one manufactured thing for another.   Secondly, Trieste breaks a cultural norm 
supported by the law: we find her robbing from the rich.44  It is an unsubstantial theft; she 
takes a spoon from one of the benefactors who financially support the internship she has 
won with Corey’s newspaper.  The theft is symbolic, but it could be detrimental if the 
principle it embodied were to become the principle that guided a way of life.  This can be 
clarified by examining the necessary conditions for the ways of life that offer fulfillment 
within contemporary culture.
Seeking self-fulfillment is an approach to a meaningful life that is to be seen in 
contrast to already being part of a meaningful order from which one’s role or place in that 
order would be sufficient to provide the context for a life of meaning.  Self- fulfillment is 
a modern notion that comes with the moral ideals related to the individual: dignity and 
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freedom of choice.  It replaced the premodern condition where meaningful orders 
pervaded the lives of everyone.  Seeking a meaningful life through the notion of self-
fulfillment is the first constraint or condition I would like to explore in relation to the 
space within which we strive for the good life in our culture.
I am going to present the concrete cases of two different attempts at living a 
meaningful life through self-fulfillment.  First will be Trieste and her generation.  The 
second will be by examining Senator Bonwiller’s life which I am relating to the hunger 
Corey ascribes to himself. My claim is that both are deviant forms of attempting to live 
by the ethic of self-fulfillment, but I want to also show that as our culture “progresses” 
these attempts become more deviant or irrational.    
Charles Taylor clarifies this issue and argues that the ambition for originality must 
be tethered to something of significance for it to be coherent and significant.  Those who 
fight so vigorously for originality for its own sake or as an ideal in itself “recognize few 
external moral demands or serious commitments to others,” and expect that everyone has 
“the right to develop their own form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really 
important or of value.” 45  Those who make this attempt are easily conflated with the 
narcissist or hedonist.  This impulse for a way of life differs from the notion of hunger 
that Corey describes his childhood with.  Hunger implies that there is something outside 
of and other than oneself that can be brought into one’s being and allowed to effect some 
change.  When this attitude is combined with the ethic of self-fulfillment, we have a 
coherent way of describing our pursuit of authenticity, as opposed to those pursuing 
originality at their whim.
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Authenticity is a form of self-fulfillment that claims that “each of us has an 
original way of being human.”46  To live up to this originality is what the morality most 
clearly espoused in our culture is about.  But when we pursue authenticity completely 
independent of any claims that other people or things may have on us, we do so with a 
disregard for the conditions of possibility for self-fulfillment.  When I just randomly 
assign the practices and attributes that make my authenticity significant, I’ve missed what 
it means to participate in something of significance.  For example, claiming my 
authenticity rests in the fact that I simply “question authority” is insignificant to any way 
of life that doesn’t have some link to something else that makes that act significant. 47 
This, opposed to the ability to be a mid-wife or the desire to fight pollution, both of 
which can be linked to one’s concern for fellow human beings or life in general, reflects 
the least tenable pursuit of authenticity.  Just deeming that something is significant fails 
to meet the criterion of significance: if just deeming that something is significant is all 
that is required to make something significant, then everything is potentially significant 
and this renders the notion of significance empty.  The power of choice is important 
because it makes the individual capable of choosing things of higher significance than 
others.  The power of choice is not capable of choosing its own ‘power of choosing’ as 
being the hallmark of significance because then, again, there would be no boundaries 
upon what is significant or not.  Every example of free choice would be an instance of 
authenticity.  This would make the content of one’s life irrelevant.  But the content of our 
lives is what is most relevant. 
The difference between the generations of Trieste and Corey-as-a-teenager is one 
marked by the pursuits of authenticity changing by degree.  Trieste doesn’t exactly 
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represent a devious form of authenticity, and it is not with her generation that these ways 
of pursuing authenticity arise, but they do seem to be tending toward more and more 
deviant forms. 48 We can see this progression by comparing the preceding example with 
the form of authenticity that marks the life of Senator Bonwiller.
Bonwiller is clearly defined, yet remains elusive.  It is hard to balance the calm 
picture we have of him reading Walt Whitman in the car with the ruthless tactics he 
employs in the attempt to become more politically powerful.  But it is clear that his whole 
life, and any form of energy put into it, is to attain the position of president. 
Unfortunately, a life absolutely committed to politics is one that is necessarily 
incomplete.  We see this play out in the lack of structure there is in Bonwiller’s life 
outside of the political arena.  The largest problems seem to be alcohol and the fact that 
his marriage is one of instrumental value.  Because his marriage is this way, it cannot 
offer the richness and structure needed in our lives outside of our work.  Worse, it is 
unclear what is motivating Bonwiller’s pursuit of the presidency.   If Bonwiller 
recognizes the fact that he is a unique person with certain attributes that make him a 
viable candidate for the presidency, the pursuit of this position becomes significant 
because of the changes he can make for social justice, protection of the environment, and 
the quality of life in general.  But if he is fueled only by unchecked personal ambition, his 
motive is narcissistic and represents a deviant form of self-fulfillment.  Corey reflects 
upon the dual nature these tensions create in a person:  
And this is where some balance must be found between its attainment and its 
allotment, between the unquenchable desire in any politician to rise, and the often 
humbling requirement that one’s station must now be used to some benefit.  And 
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here, of course, is where corruption begins; for power contains an irresistible urge 
to further itself: there is always the next race.  But when finally there isn’t any 
more, when at last there is no more ambition to quell, no more inchoate striving to 
follow as a guidestar, then a politician must make a transformation that he may 
have no more ability to make than he has to grow wings and fly.  He must change 
his personal ambition into ambition for his country.49 
Perhaps it is too ideal to think that ambition for one’s country is enough to get one 
elected to office, but that is where ultimate significance of such a position comes from – 
not from fulfilling one’s own personal ambition.  Logically, striving for greatness is 
always morally deviant.  Greatness is contingent upon things beyond one’s control. 
Discipline and perseverance are the virtues that prepare one for greatness, not 
unrestrained ambition, but only historical contingency will actually deliver the goods. 
Ambition itself is not to be stamped out of our nature - it doesn’t always direct one 
toward that which is immoral- but morality must address our actions with regard to it. 
Bonwiller becomes corrupt when he attempts to control those things that are out of his 
control.  When he begins to try to author the truth by controlling what the newspapers 
print, his ambition turns into deception and what his motives for his country are become 
diluted and unclear.
These two examples of devious forms of authenticity both point to what is needed 
for one to engage in a coherent form of authenticity or self-fulfillment.  Taylor calls this 
requirement a background of significance.  The things and practices that are being 
pursued in one’s life require a “background of intelligibility.”50  This background of 
intelligibility gives the choices we are presented with the significance they have.  When 
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choosing to pursue the office of president, Bonwiller wouldn’t be able to explain the 
significance of becoming president if the office itself didn’t have the immense 
responsibility and possibility for real social change that it does.   What makes Bonwiller’s 
motive potentially deviant and devious is that the responsibilities of the office fall away 
as his ambition for it increases:  his actions begin to negate the very nature of the office 
he hopes he will soon hold, and the depth, significance, and intelligibility that make such 
a pursuit significant in a coherent way begin to disappear.  
It is crucial to recognize that this background of intelligibility must be concretely 
instantiated.  Taylor doesn’t seem to venture into the territory of exactly what is going to 
make up a background of intelligibility and how this can be taken up with by individuals. 
To respond to this concern we have to turn to a person who appears to attend to the 
background of intelligibility required for a meaningful life.  
This person’s life would contrast with the life of Bonwiller when he is interpreted 
as a narcissist.  This interpretation of Bonwiller represents a powerful attitude in 
American culture.  Many ways of life attract individuals for the position of respect and 
status they offer without accounting for where the status or significance of the position 
comes from.  Of course most ways of life just indicate the amount of money that is 
involved in pursuing them and that is enough to quench the American mind’s need for 
significance.  But we must push through this illusion of significance and determine what 
money actually does create the opportunity for and whether or not that can provide the 
background of significance required for a rich, meaningful life. America America helps 
us here again through the illustration of the great democratic capitalist Liam Metarey.  
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I want to attempt to find the background of significance for the life of Mr. 
Metarey and do so in the concrete so we can have an example of the content of the good 
life.  Because he is affluent and not pursuing money, something else must stand as the 
object of significance in his life.  We can begin to understand what this significance is by 
attempting to understand what Corey means by “possibility” when he reflects that what 
he “longed for was not the earthly comfort of that world, [Mr. Metarey’s world], but all 
its possibility.”51 
  Mr. Metarey stands out because he resists the temptations that affluence creates 
in our culture.  He is not an out-of-control consumer seeking the next quickest and easiest 
pleasure available.  Quite to the contrary; he toils on his farm.  Outside of the expenses 
related directly to his estate, family, and community, he spends the majority of his money 
and resources on preserving the environment and campaigning for political justice.  The 
democratic impulse he has in politics also pervades his entire life.  He is responsible for 
Corey’s opportunity to get a higher education.  This defines the active Liam Metarey. 
This defines the man you would encounter if you ran into him on the street.  Of course 
his opportunities to be generous, to maintain a farm and a campaign headquarters, to 
supply members of the community with employment, to live a lifestyle that includes 
sailing and spontaneous plane rides, is a result of his wealth.  This great advantage over 
others creeps into his being, and not in the way one might expect.  He maintains his 
kindness, enthusiasm, and democratic spirit almost always, but there is a dark current that 
flows just beneath the surface of this great American man.  This must be addressed before 
describing the background of significance to his life.
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In the beginning of the book, when Corey first starts working on the estate, Liam 
tells Corey that “work will set you free.”52  Corey reflects upon this statement later in life: 
the words “returned to me with a shock when I came upon them again, six years later, on 
my first trip to Europe, and only suggested once more that our worlds –our lives- are not 
at all what they appear.”53  Corey probably saw the German words that translate into this 
phrase inscribed above the entrance way of a concentration camp in what is now 
Poland.54  His reflection suggests that Mr. Metarey perceived that daily life itself, in some 
ways, reflected the worst conditions possible.  For Mr. Metarey to make this comment 
and maintain the mood that is typical of him -kind, concerned, and interested- is to 
suggest that he was all of these things in the face of a great guilt or perceived horror that 
lay somewhere beneath the surface.  The truth of this arises out of half of his complicated 
view of nature.  Mr. Metarey finds nature exquisite, but he also deems it “utterly without 
mercy.”55  Further evidence for Mr. Metarey’s conflicted nature comes out when the 
article accusing the Senator of being involved in JoEllen’s death finally hit the 
newspaper. Corey gets a glimpse of Mr. Metarey:  “Something came over his face as he 
did – a look of sudden, deadening fatigue…he never told me what he knew about all of it, 
but at that moment, he came the closest to doing it…His face looked as though for a 
moment he’d taken off a mask.”56  Seeing the ‘real’ Mr. Metarey is described as seeing a 
man plagued by deadening fatigue.  We know Mr. Metarey was in the Korean War and 
witnessed some of the worst of what can happen to a person, and we know he is aware of 
the savage way in which his father wrestled the land and people of his time to secure his 
fortune.  Perhaps the burden of this was constantly in tension with the Mr. Metarey that 
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appeared to Corey as a child, and Mr. Metarey’s involvement in the cover-up of the death 
of JoEllen tipped the scales of his life towards seeking a final rest to his worries.57   
It is always a possibility that the hope for a good life can be shattered permanently 
by a psychological trauma, but that doesn’t close the door to the discussion of the good 
life.  There are degrees of psychological trauma and the ways of life that are espoused in 
the discussion of the good life can, more or less, still function for those with 
psychological troubles.  I mention this because part of the goal of the good life is a 
psychological one.  If our goal is fulfillment, then what tells us that we are approaching 
or participating in what fulfillment means is not simply the logical analysis of the actions 
we take with reference to the goal in mind.  That is part of it, but one’s way of life must 
also offer some sense of fulfillment, some positive feelings - in short, happiness.  How 
this works is complex and must be detailed, but I believe that those are the requirements 
to understand our goal when we seek orientation to the good life.  With this in mind there 
are moments of inspiration and fortitude that outweigh or at least counterbalance the idea 
that Mr. Metarey’s life is ‘truly’ dark and without beauty, humor, and a sense of love. 
Corey rarely portrays Mr. Metarey as anything short of the greatest person he has ever 
known and his measure of a person is one that seems fit to be deemed excellent.58 
Further, there is a coherency to the practices, commitments, and values that frame Mr. 
Metarey’s life that can be explicated to show how orientation to the good life can be 
found and a hint to its structure even if it cannot provide happiness for one with a 
damaged or uncharacteristic psychology.  I want to turn to these things and hold them up 
to the light of what can first make Mr. Metarey’s, and in turn our, daily life significant.   
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If our goal is a life of meaning and significance, of depth and accomplishment, 
within a world of just dealings, then the practices we participate in must be able to offer 
this meaning, and they must be open to all, to some degree.  For this reason, I am going 
to pick two events that fit this criterion in America America that seem to answer, in a 
particular, concrete way, the question concerning the need of orientation in our daily 
lives.  The events will articulate part of the background of significance to Mr. Metarey’s 
life and suggest a way to begin to answer, in a concrete and principled manner, the 
question of orientation.        
Section Two.  Daily-Life Practices
The first event I will discuss is the mundane task of shoveling the driveway.  In 
this example I want to point out the following: first, there is a unique way of thinking 
required to strive for the good life; second, significance arises as a force outside of 
ourselves and supplies meaning through our relationship with something other than what 
we arbitrarily choose or simply feel holds significance; third, I want to argue that the 
context of such happenings is absolutely crucial and that things and practices of 
significance require that our relationship to them is defined by closeness. 
In one scene during a snowstorm the tractor that is used to plow the driveway 
breaks down.  We find Corey and Liam discussing the situation.  Corey suggests that he 
can call his neighbor and borrow his tractor.  “Oh no, [Liam responds].  The trick’s to see 
the opportunity.  That’s what my old man would have said.  Come on – let’s pull the 
damn thing back into the barn and then we can get to shoveling by hand.”59  Here, Liam 
chooses to be guided by a principle his father has taught him.  Of course to Corey such an 
endeavor seemed “odd.”  And even for the reader, choosing to toil, when the means to 
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effortlessly clear the driveway are a phone call away, perhaps seems skewed.  What is 
guiding Liam to choose to engage in such an activity?  What exactly is this an 
opportunity for?   
Charles Taylor points out the fact that one of the causes of the malaise or 
meaninglessness in our current culture is the absolute dominance of instrumental reason. 
Describing instrumental reason as “the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate 
the most economical application of means to a given end,” he suggests that this has added 
to the disenchantment of the world. 60  The dominance of instrumental reason is another 
one of the great forces in our culture that is not addressed by Rawls and his stance of 
neutrality on the space of the good life.  Instrumental reason governs our dealings to the 
extent that it has become taken for granted that the easiest, quickest, most economical 
means to any end is the good way to proceed.  What this does to our daily lives is 
structure them in a way that extracts us from the intimate contact we could have with a 
task and puts us at a technological distance from it to complete the task quicker and 
easier.  
Between Corey and the snow and the driveway are a tractor and a plow.  The 
human effort required to push snow uphill or downhill is the same.  But as soon as it 
becomes apparent that Liam wants to shovel the driveway by hand, the fact that the 
“drive [is] sloping uphill to the sycamores” is no longer a missed feature of the 
landscape.61  What is beginning to happen in this scene is that elements of reality are 
rising to the fore in an instance where a technological fix would have left them concealed. 
Interestingly, Liam states that “Seneca Indians used to do this sort of thing when they 
wanted a vision,” referring to the seemingly “impossible” task of physical exertion that 
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lay before them. 62  The Seneca didn’t live in a world characterized by disenchantment. 
Their world was characterized by a spiritual order found in nature that could be interacted 
with through the intimate contact they had with their environment and each other.  There 
was no question of how one lives a good life or where one finds meaning in life in their 
culture; the Seneca were always and already part of a great order of significance, and an 
individual’s role in their band was anointed simply by the context in which they found 
themselves.  We are lacking this context now – for good and bad reasons.  But the 
solution to recovering the good and meaningful in our lives is not to revert to the belief 
system that structured the lives of the Seneca; that would be working in the wrong 
direction.  Instead, we should turn to reality to seek orientation by first recognizing the 
technological distance we put between ourselves and reality and that there is something 
to gain by breaking this distance down.  This is captured in old man Metarey’s phrase “to 
see the opportunity.”  The opportunity is not, ironically, one of a cost-benefit analysis 
that might be praised by such a capitalist family; rather, Liam and Corey find themselves 
in a position where the world is putting a claim on them and they rise to meet the 
challenge through active engagement because of what that offers to those involved:  to 
see it as an end in itself as opposed to seeing the shoveling simply as a means to another 
end.  
Perhaps this is a virtue that capitalism has erased or lost along the way.  Instead of 
being guided solely by instrumental reason towards the most efficient means to the 
decided upon end, the activities that make up the content of such pursuits are ends in 
themselves, as well as means; they can make up the rich content of our lives.   To 
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understand more clearly the “opportunity” shoveling gives Liam and Corey, we must 
look closer at what instrumental reason fails to provide.
One of the difficulties with instrumental reason is that, like some analytic and 
some continental philosophy, it is aimless.  Why do we want the most efficient means to 
our given ends?  What are we to do once we get to these ends?  This is, in part, the state 
of contemporary culture.  Instrumental reason has driven our society to solve the 
problems that present themselves as intolerable to our lives.  Medical research discovers 
cures and vaccines for diseases that would otherwise strip some of the possibility for life 
at all.  Here, instrumental reason as the guide for solving problems should be championed 
when the needs are appropriate to what it can provide: economical, efficient, scientific 
solutions.  But in terms of how we are to live our lives and what makes them purposeful 
by explaining what practices we are to incorporate into our lives and why, it is unclear 
why we would be seeking economy and efficiency only.  We are also seeking happiness, 
meaning, richness, and the possibility of fulfillment.  I want to argue that such an end is 
final and contextual and cannot be captured through an instrumental approach.  Eoghan 
Metarey’s vision of “opportunity” speaks to how such ends may be striven for. 
Technology as a human artifact or device that has the ability to change our 
involvement with and perception of space in our daily life for reasons of ease and 
efficiency (as it eliminates the difference between the strain of pushing snow uphill as 
opposed to down in this example) constructs a kind of abstract space in our lives.  To 
some extent we are abstracted from our context and lose the closeness to a reality that 
engages our capacities to a different extent. But when technology breaks down, or we 
consciously choose to limit what technology we include in our practices, we confront our 
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context in a way in which it offers us something final.  Towards the end of shoveling 
Corey notes that he “began to feel the euphoria of that kind of hard work in that kind of 
cold weather.  Of that kind of discipline against what the inner voice says is 
insurmountable.”63  Euphoria can be caused by many things: drugs, sex, great exertion (as 
here), or through spiritual meditation.  As stated before, positive feelings are only a sign 
that something of significance was experienced; they are not always necessary for an 
experience to be significant, and they most certainly are not sufficient for deeming an 
experience significant.  What is needed to supplement this feeling is an explanation of 
how the experience fits in to the ‘background of intelligibility” of our world and our goal 
of finding a rich, meaningful, happy life.  
Here I think we are required to address the fact that our lives necessarily consist 
of the tasks required for living.  What this concretely means differs from person to 
person, but everyone is charged in some way with facing the tasks of simply living and 
must produce some way of living.  What I believe is lost to instrumental reason, and, in 
turn, to a majority of the practices engaged with in our culture, is, first, that the means to 
the ends are absolutely crucial:  how I reach a state of euphoria, or how the tasks of daily 
living are achieved must play some role in determining the character of the practices we 
engage in, not just the fact that they have procured the desired end.  Connected to this is 
the fact that the source of significance stems from that which I am engaged with.  Taylor 
clearly makes this point about the content of the major commitments one has in one’s 
life, such as “God, or a political cause, or tending the earth,” but he doesn’t address the 
manner in which daily activities should be fulfilled such that we can understand them as 
adding to the sense of fulfillment of our lives rather than detracting from them. 64
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  One way to respond to the “inconveniences” of daily living is to replace all of 
the activities that are required of us to maintain a dwelling and provide sustenance for 
ourselves by following the guide of instrumental reason, but in doing so we lose 
something important.  Consider the difference between the estates of Corey’s past and the 
ones of his present:
The Wantik property is magnificent – horse stables, a dark-bottomed pool, a main 
house built from stone that looks as though it was brought over by ship from an 
English manor with the moss still on it.  It’s even more impressive at a glance 
than Aberdeen West used to be.  Even at its apex, the Metarey estate maintained 
all the equipment and services of a working piece of land, while at the Wantiks’ 
you’d be hard-pressed to find a stack of firewood.  Let alone a metal lathe.  But 
you could no doubt take your choice from a shelf of extra-plush towels in a 
variety of colors if you wandered into one of the pool cabanas.65
The Wantik property is a mansion that Corey goes to as an adult.  The mansion’s virtues 
are that it looks as if it was transplanted from another time and place, and that it is 
seemingly self-sufficient without human participation.  But these virtues are mocked by 
Corey in the final analysis with his ability to point out the only remaining activity 
associated to the estate.  The magnificence of the mansion is superficial.  It belongs in a 
museum; it has replaced all possible life-enriching activity or engagement related to daily 
living with the technology that will simply procure the ends desired.  This leaves those 
associated with it to engage in absolutely insignificant activities such as choosing which 
color towel they want to use.  Here, our capacities are left unexercised; we are expected 
to have no skill, and any pleasure associated with what we do participate in leaves us 
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craving the material means that Wantik has simply because of the fleeting pleasure they 
produce and the power they have in making our lives easier, two things that we should be 
suspicious of when we consider the character and trajectory of our lives.  
Let us return to the first example to concretize the background of significance of 
the engaging practices related to daily life. Liam and Corey don’t ignore the claim the 
snow, the hill, and the cold make on them by seeking the quickest and easiest way to 
complete the task before them, perhaps with the goal in mind to move on to more 
significant endeavors.  In our daily lives we can get swept away with this type of 
thinking.  We fulfill one task simply to begin another.  Our lives can stretch out behind us 
as a long continuum of episodes and activities that can easily be seen as constructing a 
meaningless whole.  The power of contemporary culture is its ability to mask this.  It 
does so by incorporating pleasure into its practices and discouraging the need for 
reflection.  Pleasure can easily be mistaken for happiness: it is part of it.  But happiness 
requires moral significance and pleasure is merely a psychological state.  
Significance arises out of the relationship Liam and Corey have with their context 
and each other during their activity.  Their context engages some of their capacities to an 
extreme extent as well as confronting them with the eloquence of reality, where reality’s 
claim is brought closer to them once the technological distance is broken down.  There is 
the possibility of accomplishment in its significant sense here.  Again, “accomplishment” 
is another term of significance that requires more than the feeling of euphoria or pleasure. 
Both the context that one finds oneself in and the company one finds oneself with, along 
with reference to one’s own capacities, as well as the place the practice has in one’s daily 
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life, all this determines the possible sense of (significant) accomplishment that practices 
may provide.
Now we can sketch the moral difference between plowing the drive with a tractor 
and shoveling it by hand.  First, the technological space that is being experienced does 
not engage one’s capacities in the way it does when the same practice must be completed 
without technology.  Because of this the technological practice offers a lesser degree of 
accomplishment and gets pushed towards being simply of instrumental value.  Second, 
the opportunity for this particular environment’s reality to become eloquent, or for it to 
begin to reveal itself in all of its dimensions, is to some degree lost.  The falling snow and 
the coming dark (along with the knowledge that a warm house is close by for when the 
task is done) can make for a magnificent visual setting, but the sounds of snow fall and 
owls hooting during their night hunting, and the scent of the night air, will be displaced 
by the roar of an engine and the powerful smell of burning fuel.  Finally, the solitary 
activity of plowing removes the possibility for a moment of significance to occur through 
the recognition of another.   
In the end, I don’t think these factors decide for us whether or not we should plow 
driveways or shovel them by hand; there is no universal rule about snow removal to 
deduce from this example.  But what the example does show us is that, by degree, we can 
incorporate activities in our lives that can offer us significance through accomplishment 
in relation to our context of daily living.  
Understandably the example above may seem mundane and not capable of being 
part of the content of the good life.  In our current culture’s collective imagination, 
success (the good life) is in part defined by the ability to avoid or escape onerous 
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practices.  But I want to point out that this follows only if we take an instrumental 
approach to our practices.  Although at times burdensome and necessarily endless, the 
tasks of house-holding are part of our lives.  The things that are naturally a part of our 
lives should be addressed in a thoughtful way.  First, we must recognize that the nature of 
happiness requires that we find significance in what we do, not simply in the ends 
procured by what we do.  This forces us to consider how we are going to do things, all 
things.  Second, we must recognize the presence of technology.  Technology has the 
ability to limit our engagement with the tasks that must be done.  Before we get starry- 
eyed with technology’s ability to almost eliminate our involvement in practices like 
house-holding, we must be wary about what we are losing if we replace engagements like 
shoveling, heating our homes, and cooking with their technological “fixes.”  The first 
things of importance to the good life that I suggest we lose are the closeness and 
accomplishment described in the example of Corey and Liam shoveling.  But one could 
argue that these two elements of the good life could be found in different instances if we 
eliminated the need to engage in the tasks of house-holding.  Instead of shoveling a 
driveway, we could be spending that time climbing a mountain or hiking through a 
marsh.  The problem with this type of response is that it ignores the structure or rhythm 
and necessity of daily living.  Our consciousness of this rhythm is a crucial element to 
what I have been calling closeness.   Whether you have a million servants or the most 
self-sufficient technology possible, one will still need to lie down to sleep at night and 
rise in the morning and answer to his growling stomach.  Attempting to cut out the 
engagement with the tasks of house-holding requires a technological fix; actually cutting 
out the need for practices entirely is not an option.  That this is the case forces us to 
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recognize that happiness is, in part, meeting the claim that the rhythm of a day imposes 
upon us.  How this is done is what is of crucial importance.  From the example and 
argument above I have suggested that it be done, if our aim is a rich, meaningful, life, 
with the notion of closeness and accomplishment in mind.  Allowing technology or 
someone else to fulfill the tasks of house-holding eliminates all chance for these tasks to 
be done with an experience of closeness or a sense of accomplishment.  
Importantly, I don’t want to suggest that we eliminate technology.  I have been 
using the term technology to refer to the human-made artifacts that replace our 
involvement with the sustainability and enrichment of our own lives.  Our goal is 
happiness, and happiness is found, not through deadening toil, but through engagement 
with the practices that present themselves as part of our position as house-holders, 
members of society, workers (in the richest sense), and inhabitants of nature.
The example given above that can stand for the activities related to house-holding 
is made significant by the context of Mr. Metarey’s dwelling.  The land, the weather, his 
house, the fields, the trees, and the water define the base or concrete strata from which 
significance in life can emerge.  The land is significant because it produces and sustains 
the footing on which anything we do rests.  Wendell Berry suggests that the “ground 
under [our] feet” is the common ground from which equality and freedom can be given 
its content.66  Since what we do on this land can suggest what is worth being free and 
equal for it seems prudent to look for a specific way the land itself can orient us.     
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Section Three.  The Tree as a Thing of Orientation
To clarify the importance of the content and context of the activities we engage 
in, I now want to turn to a second example in America America that can be articulated by 
relating it to Heidegger’s essay “Art and Space.”
Attempting to uncover “genuine space,” Heidegger links the etymology of the 
German word for space to the notion of “clearing away”.  Space, in this sense, hints that 
“clearing away brings forth locality preparing for dwelling.”67  I have described dwelling 
above as the involvement and participation with the conditions, context, and tasks that are 
required in dwelling.  These tasks are to be done in a way that is marked by closeness and 
accomplishment.  When we consider the leveling of the Metarey estate in order to clear 
the way for the mall that will replace it, our comparison between what the estate offered 
in terms of closeness and accomplishment and what the mall offers brings an important 
truth to the fore about the direction our culture is going.   
Malls are our nation’s monuments to consumption.  Our skills are left 
unemployed while we shop.  The relationship between the items we purchase and the 
contexts in which they are produced is non-existent.  We are even ripped out of the actual 
environment within which the mall is placed.  Temperature controls replace the weather. 
Artificial light replaces the pace at which the day is marked out by the arc transcribed by 
sun.  Scenery is replaced by advertising.  Essentially, our technological powers and the 
quick, easy pleasure of consumption create an artificial environment within which our 
long-term concerns are driven to the back of our minds and our desires are met by the 
fleeting sense of power and pleasure procured through consumption.         
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There is something corrupt about the way of life represented by the mall. 
Heidegger helps to explain this.  “Clearing away is the release of places.”68  “Release” is 
to be contrasted with “creation.”  Genuine space, the space within which we will find the 
tasks and work that mark a life of significance, is not created; it is found, and in this case 
allowed to show itself.  The mall does the exact opposite.  It creates its own environment 
and tasks.  One way of illustrating the loss that this creates is by the fact that I could put 
you in a mall anywhere in the country and then ask you to close your eyes and then I 
could transport you to another mall elsewhere in the country and you would not be able to 
tell me where in the world you are by relating the differences of contexts you notice.  It’s 
not an earth-shaking point, but it highlights the loss associated with mapping a self-
created context over the one that actually has a claim on us and that we are required to 
respond to in order to dwell – the one that can be released through the clearing away 
Heidegger is talking about.  By “required,” I mean that we must engage with what is 
being concealed, but is ever-present, behind the technological infrastructure.  We meet 
this reality when technology breaks down or we attempt to sideline it for moral reasons.  
  I am strongly tempted to adjust Heidegger’s phrase “clearing-away” so that it 
more clearly suggests “clearing-a-way.”  Clearing-a-way suggests the release of places by 
finding a relationship with our contexts that appropriately and uniquely addresses us in 
our capacity and needs.  This can be clarified by the idea that dwelling is not exemplified 
by something like the mall in that it overrides place and temporarily pacifies our desires 
through activities that are marked by the pleasures and ease of consumption.  Rather, 
clearing-a-way puts us in a position where the relationship of our capacities and needs to 
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the claims of our surroundings is one of engaging interaction promoting a sense of 
significance.  
The revealing aspect of space or clearing away is that it “gathers…things in their 
belonging together.”69  Our belonging to the context we find ourselves in requires 
explication.  How do we belong to our environment or world?  The answer to this 
question gives us the mode of being in the world.  For Heidegger it is a specifically 
ontological question.  But it seems that it must be an ontological and moral question. 
Ontology reveals accurately the world in which we live and the type of beings we are. 
But it, by itself, is not enough to allow us to conclude that how we are (even at some 
primordial or essential level) is how we should be.  A moral dimension must be added, 
and the gap between what is and what should be must be bridged.  The moral dimension, 
I want to argue, opens up when an individual becomes an advocate of significance. 
Someone speaks in a certain way for something significant (without deception and from 
genuine feelings invoked by the thing being spoken for) and thus what is being spoken 
for emerges as morally significant.  This is not to say that it is one’s ability to speak a 
certain way that determines what is significant; this would allow for a deceptive 
discourse that could arbitrarily assign significance to things.  Significance ultimately 
comes only from a thing or practice or event and our relationship to it, and these two 
elements can’t be split when evaluating moral discourse.  But, that being said, it is only 
how that thing, event, or practice resonates with an individual that the moral dimension 
opens up.  Enthusiasm for something and the expression of devastation over the loss of 
something are both moral expressions.  Importantly, I don’t want to imply that this is in 
any way subjective.  The subject’s response or mode of speaking for something is only 
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the hint that something is significant.  The thing itself, which invokes such a response, is 
the final arbiter of whether or not it is significant in general.  But we can only get there 
through experience or by being guided there.  Things of general significance, things that 
can “gather things in their belonging together,” are where we turn for orientation in our 
lives.
Heidegger claims that the sculpture in its ability to gather and embody a region or 
a context and disclose the “dwelling for man” could be an orienting force that counters 
the reign of instrumental reason.70  Although this may be true in the sense that it is 
possible for a sculpture to do that, the example of sculpture in America America actually 
conceals reality rather than disclosing it.  I want to argue that the actual tree, not the 
sculpture that replaced it, can act as something we can be oriented by, and that Corey’s 
reaction of devastation when he discovers that the tree has been removed is the signal of 
its significance.
Compare the great bur oak of Corey’s childhood to the sculpture.  We encounter 
this tree of the past when Corey and his father are asked by Mr. Metarey to fix a 
plumbing problem on the estate.  Again, Mr. Metarey does not subscribe to instrumental 
reason to figure out the solution to the problem.  The most efficient and economical way 
of dealing with the plumbing problem created by the oak’s root system would be to fell 
the great tree so that no problems will arise in the future.  It would be a method of 
securing dwelling from the inconveniences of the claims of other things and other people. 
In contrast to this, we are presented with the following care-full, skill-demanding, and 
patience requiring task of working with the tree:
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And that was what we did then, before it was even light.  The drip line of the tree 
reached well past the sewer, and when we arrived at Aberdeen West my father set 
to work with a lantern and an iron spike, testing the ground for roots.  The big 
house was still dark.  My father was whistling “Roddy McCorley,” but softly, and 
now and then he glanced up at the windows.  When he was finished with the 
spike, we began digging, but before we were even down as far as our boots we 
had to switch from shovels to spades, wedging their narrow heads between the 
roots.  They were everywhere.  His whistling stopped.  He gently pulled back the 
end of a tendril but as soon as he let go it dropped back into the hole.  He stood 
looking at it in the rising light which was still pale but already warm on my back. 
“What would you use here, Cor?” he finally said.
“Half-hitch?”
“Not gentle enough.  Mr. Metarey’s paying us not to hurt the tree.”
“Two half-hitches and a round-turn, then.”
“That’s what I would use,” he said.  “Or a double-loop bowline.”
It was almost noon before I could stand as deep as my waist in the short section 
that we’d dug…The pipe still lay another foot or two below us.  Around me, a net 
of tendrils hung gently in the set of slings I’d been making from mason’s line.  A 
web of thicker arterial roots still stretched across the channel, though as intricately 
crossed as the tree’s crown, and at this depth we had to bend over to dig in them.71 
The loss of this great tree represents how we are part of a culture that is on its way of 
thinning and cropping out our contexts of concern that make up the concrete background 
of significance required for lives of significance.  In Charles Taylor’s presentation of 
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arguing for a coherent form of authenticity, he leaves out the fact that all the possible 
practices that provide this type of authenticity require a concrete, tangible setting.  It is in 
these things that significance is first confronted, then reflected upon, and finally 
incorporated into our lives.  The leveling and homogenization of our tangible settings 
strips us of the possibility of having regions or localities marked out by a natural and 
cultural history where things can maintain or gain moral significance.  
The demands of the tree give Corey a task of significance.  They demand skill and 
care.  This skill and care is passed down from his father as Corey apprentices himself in 
his work.  The work they do is done with awareness of the conditions required for their 
work: to avoid as best they can the high heat, they attempt to start before morning light. 
All of this positions Corey and his father in a relation with their context that engages their 
physical and mental skill for a matter of purpose: clearing-a-way with nature, not 
dominating it.  The skills required and the context differs from the settings and devices 
that epitomize the interactions of the technological culture.  
Consider the difference between using a computer and working on the tree the 
way Corey and his father do.  Today, computers require no setting. Instead they impose 
an orientation to the world on us.  The laptop can be brought and used anywhere.  Having 
this freedom leaves us nowhere.  The orientation and type of interaction the computer 
offers is either one of consumption (where a curiosity is satiated) or the computer 
provides a service that requires only an input, like the use of a calculator.  Incorporating 
the computer into one’s daily life is to make these practices easier and faster, not more 
fulfilling or engaging.  Going to the theatre is replaced by videos.  Letter writing is 
replaced by email.  The depth and dimension of particularity of these practices is 
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exchanged for ease and efficiency, and we are left partaking in activities that lack a 
centering force to our lives.  In contrast, dealing directly with the tree Corey meets 
something in all of its particularity and bottomless depth.  The physical exhaustion from 
the work tells Corey that he is engaged in something demanding.  This demand comes 
from what the tree is (not a representation of what the tree is) in relation to Corey’s 
capacities, skills, and needs.  This union is an example of how a tree “gathers things in 
their belonging together.”  An orientation to the world through the tree can highlight what 
is trivial about the computer by comparing the significance it brings, or fails to bring, to 
our lives.  
Now consider the tree as a sculpture and Corey’s reaction to it as further 
testimony to what is problematic about exchanging things and practices for artificial 
replacements that fail to put demands upon us. 
From a distance the sculpture is mistaken for the actual tree.72  Technology and 
representational art are both excellent at mimicking reality but ultimately must fail and be 
something other than what they are attempting to represent or procure.  The dimensions 
specific to a certain thing cannot be entirely accounted for unless the thing is quite 
literally reproduced.  Technological devices don’t reproduce things, they replace them. 
We realize this as Corey gets closer to the tree the same way we should recognize the 
attractiveness of technology and its ultimate failure to center our lives.  As the tree comes 
into resolution, the material it is made of, its lack of leaves, and Corey’s father’s 
description of its construction force Corey to say, “This is the fall of our culture, Dad. 
This is the end of a way of life.”73  What has ended or what has been lost are the concrete, 
engaging conditions that made up the context of Corey’s and his father’s life.  The tree is 
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a bronze-plated concrete monument.  Its shape was probably designed with a computer 
program.  Corey and his father will never be asked to come tend to the roots of the tree in 
hopes of saving it and living with it.  It requires no care to maintain its survival – it is not 
living.  The sculpture represents the way the culture has begun to suck the life out of the 
things we could have the opportunity to engage with.  This “life” is the source from 
which the opportunity of engagement – meaningful actions related to a possible way of 
life – comes from.  Without it, we begin to surround ourselves with objects that disorient 
us and distance us from the things related to living and significant ways of life.
        Ultimate significance rests in the meaning behind the mystery of the curve of the 
trunk, the texture of the bark, the outline of silhouette of the branches as they extend 
outward and up, and the changing color and frailty of the leaves “of the grandest of God’s 
trees.”74  This is lost, in degree, when we stand before technological devices or tree 
sculptures.
I invoke God here to hint at that which is sacred.  Belief is not required, only awe. 
This awe paired with an understanding of our embeddedness within that which is worthy 
of and invokes awe (the sacred) undergirds the life of significance.   The justification of 
what is worthy of awe are the things themselves – their power, when properly spoken for, 
is the ability to gather a place and people, engage our capacities in a rich and complete 
way, and link us to an order or way of life that can be illuminated and experienced as 
meaningful.   
Just giving an example of how the tree in contrast to a technological device can be 
a means of orientation is not enough.  I must connect my example of an orienting thing 
(tree) to specific practices that can be taken up with in our culture.  I must show how we 
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can find the rewarding engagement that makes up the content of a practice that is part of 
the good life at the level of a relationship between people and a tree.  
I am encouraged in the direction I am taking my investigation by a suggestion 
made by Wendell Berry: “We have perhaps sufficient testimony, from artists and 
scientists both, that if we watch, refine our intelligence and our attention, curb our greed 
and our pride, work with care, have faith, a single tree might be enough” for orientation 
in our lives. 75  
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Chapter Three
Between Theory and Narrative: Moral Discourse and Orientation 
I have endorsed the move away from the abstract in order to secure a real sense 
for our lives.  I do not think my rejection of purely abstract thinking means that I am 
arguing from something other than a philosophical standpoint.  Wendell Berry writes that 
“directly opposed to… [the] abstraction of things is the idea of preciousness of individual 
lives and places.”76  I have attempted to introduce this necessary element into moral 
discourse by bringing narrative into the discussion.  The power of narrative comes from 
the concrete reality that it depicts and the “preciousness,” the awe-inspiring elements, and 
depth associated with reality.  But it is by extracting reasoned discourse from the 
testimony about the concrete, somewhere between the concrete and abstract, between 
narrative and theory, where a specifically philosophical and moral language can arise in 
its own unique way.  Narrative, besides being a diagnostic tool, can be the jumping off 
point or source from which moral discourse can arise.  The discourse will not be abstract, 
but it will generalize about the concrete “here and now” by pointing out patterns or ways 
of action that appropriately address, by accounting for and stemming from, this ‘here and 
now.’    
I will attempt to proceed with what I am calling moral discourse by grounding the 
notion of orientation within this discourse.  I will explicate a particular notion of 
orientation with respect to Corey Sifter while attempting to speak of orientation in a more 
general way, referring to other narratives.
67
Section One.  Orientation to a World
I began this essay discussing navigational orientation.  I think it is crucial to 
return to this idea in the concrete.  We are given an example of this in the beginning of 
America America.  There we are presented with the Lodge Chief, a “great Norway pine. 
The Lodge Chief had been planted three hundred years ago by the Seneca as a beacon for 
lake travelers, and in its deep shade I sat looking over forty miles of tree and meadow.” 77 
The tree actually provided a means for orientation to those traveling over the lake.  I have 
suggested that once again a tree can provide us with orientation.  But orientation has 
come to mean something more than merely having one’s bearings.  Orientation also 
means having our bearings towards something that is a matter of concern.   This protects 
us from “the freedom of arbitrariness” and possible meaninglessness in a world that is 
stripped of landmarks.  What makes a tree something that is a matter of concern?  
In the previous chapter I argued that the tree is significant because it “gathers 
things in their belonging together.”  This was described as the tree demanding to be 
treated in a specific way; otherwise it would be destroyed (the fate of the tree when 
viewed by blind instrumental reason after it presents itself as impinging upon our 
immediate existence, or if it is seen as merely a useful resource) or it wouldn’t be a tree 
(example of the tree as a sculpture).  The Berry quote that concluded that chapter and my 
discussion of the ultimate meaning of a tree suggests that a tree is surrounded by a 
meaningful mystery or possibility that can continuously rejuvenate our own existence. 
But that rejuvenation doesn’t happen by simply going to a tree and demanding 
rejuvenation from it.   I believe that we must respond in a unique way in our encounter 
68
with the tree or gathering thing in order for it to be able to play some role in sustaining us 
in our lives in a substantial, enduring way.
Heidegger discusses the power of a thing more completely in his essay “The 
Thing.”78  Unfortunately, the example that Heidegger gives of a thing is embedded in a 
very specific time and place which is left concealed in his essay.  This makes it difficult 
to understand exactly how the thing has this power to orient us in our lives or allow the 
space within which a rich, meaningful life may unfold.  But he does suggests the need for 
a unique way of thinking (which also entails a way of acting) that “is a step back from the 
thinking that merely represents – that is, explains – to the thinking that responds and 
recalls.”79 From this I believe we can take further moral guidance.  If we could find a way 
to engage and respond to our environment, our world, and the things that are central to 
our specific time and place, then through them we can gain perspective on the order of 
our lives.  This perspective is ultimately orientation, and it would put us in a position to 
actively participate in the good that life has to offer.  If we take this idea of the power of 
things and add to it the notion of dwelling that Heidegger illuminates in “Building 
Dwelling Thinking” (“BDT”), we can round out our understanding of orientation and see 
how it may be applied to the life of Corey Sifter, and our lives. 80 
In “BDT,” Heidegger describes dwelling as the essence of what humans do: “The 
way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is…
dwelling.”81  Building is subsumed by dwelling in that it is part of dwelling: it is not to be 
thought of as an entirely different activity.  And “building as dwelling unfolds into the 
building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings.”82  It is 
important to think of these activities always and already part of what it means to dwell. 
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So it becomes deviant to construct something without having in mind what it is that we 
are building for and how it fits into the world within which we must dwell.  However, to 
construct something with dwelling in mind is in effect a way to reveal the reality within 
which we dwell.  For example, Heidegger describes how an “old bridge in Heidelberg” 
reveals the landscape and nestles into the environment in a way that differs from building 
without care or concern for our dwelling place, which results in buildings simply being 
plopped into the landscape, standing out as alien structures, and disorienting us in our 
lives. 83
Building without regard for one’s larger context is morally problematic when 
these buildings begin to orient our lives for us.  The point can be seen as socially 
problematic when we consider the way in which it is analogous to our work lives.  Those 
who have professions in which their duties are so removed from the way in which they 
impact others’ lives and the world can be easily disenchanted with their jobs.  They work 
inside of closed systems that don’t have a visible relation to the larger context within 
which their whole life plays out.  In contrast, those who have jobs that are intimately 
connected with the effect of their work, such as the work of a nurse, can have a work-life 
that adds to the sense of fulfillment in their lives beyond merely providing the needed 
financial or material means for survival.  
Corey Sifter’s life was once oriented in a way analogous to that of a nurse. 
During Bonwiller’s campaign, Corey met “the most famous political writer…and the best 
one, too,” New York Times reporter G.V. Trawbridge, the man who eventually revealed 
the truth of Bonwiller’s extra-marital affair and his possible connection to JoEllen 
Charney’s death.84  Trawbridge won the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting during the 
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Bonwiller campaign.  But Corey realized the significance of becoming a reporter in 
something beyond merely his admiration for Trawbridge as an excellent journalist. 
Trawbridge is described as physically weak; he suffered from a deformity he had had 
from birth and from multiple sclerosis.  One day during a rainstorm, he slipped and fell 
into a swale filled with mud.  Corey eventually finds him stuck there helplessly and 
unsuccessfully struggling to free himself.  Corey lifts him up and brings him inside. 
Given Trawbridge’s physical condition, Corey rescued him from a situation in which 
Trawbridge, without the help of someone else, could have perished.  It is here, during this 
rescue, that Corey understood and felt the significance associated with being a journalist:
And yet somehow, I also think back on this moment as one of the essential turns 
of my life, that the shame of holding the great man in such a state transmitted a 
kind of duty and honor to me also, and that it committed me in my own far 
slighter way to follow his path.  And although it might sound far-fetched, I 
believe that something passed between the two of us in these moments, some 
acknowledgment of station and consequence and human obligation that is 
impossible to explain but that still has hold of me today.”85
This noble pursuit that so clearly has a background of significance defined by the 
importance of a position of revealing the truth through the practice of journalism was 
eventually thrown off its tracks by the culture at large.  We are told that Corey’s best-
selling issue in recent years was one that covered the success of a local football player 
climbing in the ranks of the sport.86  The paper is no longer the sentinel for the people it 
was when Corey was a child.  Of course this detracts from the meaningfulness of Corey’s 
work and adds to the way he ultimately reflects upon the nature of contemporary life.
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Since we have less control over the quality of our work lives, we must begin to 
address the concerns of orientation in our lives outside of work.  Corey can’t force the 
world to be interested in real matters of concern or to demand that his town show an 
interest in a newspaper written by fellow residents rather than stock news written for the 
entire nation by a handful of national papers.  But he can address the structure and 
content of his life outside of work.
Orientation for our individual lives must always begin with where we currently 
are.  Corey states, at the end of the novel, that “now that my wife is so busy, and our own 
girls have gone their way in the world, these hours with my father are among the most 
lovely of my week.  That’s what it comes down to, I guess.  We still like to walk in those 
hills, especially when it’s warm, and sometimes now we just stand in them.”87  For Corey, 
happiness comes from the time he spends with his father in the hills of the nature 
preserve.  But it is a relatively disengaged happiness driven by a sense of fatalism.  We 
have the image of Corey no longer asserting his position as a person of the world.  He 
seems to be attempting to take on the role of the trees that he admires as he just stands in 
the hills.  This can be related to his claims that “a wistful melancholy is a rather pleasant 
way to spend an afternoon,”88 and that “the thought of a glass of wine with my wife on 
our back patio, where on most afternoons we can watch our downhill neighbor sweeping 
the deck around his swimming pool is sufficient to get me through a day.”89  Although 
none of these suggestions for how a day should be spent are reprehensible, they reflect 
the disengaged passivity associated with the consumer who seeks only “conventional 
comfort, ease, and plentitude.”90  His attitude or disposition would be less worrisome if it 
didn’t seem to be governed by a sense of fatalism or defeat characterized by the notion 
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that he is powerless when it comes to the structure and content of his life. But that is 
exactly how it seems when Corey suggests that “our lives are not at all what they 
appear… All of us, no matter how difficult this may be to accept, are merely marking a 
course set early in our days.”91  Although this disposition may accurately respond to how 
Corey might feel about the events of his past that he no longer does have any adequate 
control over, they do not suggest a way of dealing with them now or living the rest of his 
life.  Importantly, feeling powerless and being powerless are not the same.  Here a 
sentiment is confused for a fact.  Instead of rejecting the nature of his being (a person 
from a specific place and time with a unique history), which is a form of disorientation, 
Corey could attempt to reorient himself to a meaningful endeavor through a certain 
practical engagement.  If he can no longer find fulfillment in his work or his family, then 
he could turn to the trees that he loves, just in a different way than he does at the end of 
the novel.92
Instead of becoming the tree, he could find a way to engage with the tree by 
reviving a practice that comes from outside of the culture dominated by instrumental 
reason.  We can begin to discover how he could do this by following Heidegger’s cue. 
Heidegger says that cultivation and construction are the ways in which we build as 
dwelling.  A little clearer, cultivation and construction are the ways we can practically 
engage with and in the world as dwelling, and they are appropriate and meaningful when 
we bear in mind the fact that we are dwelling in a time not of our choosing.  Instead of an 
attitude of mimesis, Corey could have the attitude of cultivation and care towards trees; 
he could follow the lead of Mr. Metarey who attended to the bark of his oak trees each 
year.93  This is the richest way humans, with their particularities and capacities can be 
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oriented in the world.  From this we can find a sense of position in the world: a position 
that we are not powerless in but attendant to and empowered by.  
I must concretize this notion.  Corey is from upstate New York.  This part of the 
world is unique for many reasons.  One of these reasons is that from the sugar maple trees 
of this region of North America sap can be harvested to make maple syrup.94  By 
incorporating the practice of cultivation in the form of attending to maple trees to make 
maple syrup, Corey can re-engage with the world in a way that gives him a role in its 
order.  But as Heidegger warns, we can’t think of cultivation (making maple syrup) as a 
task that is separate from our dwelling (or our lives as a whole) that can be justified by 
some notion of instrumental value.  Since this is a practice that was first adopted from the 
Native American culture, it has its roots in a way of thinking that differs from the way of 
thinking that dominates our contemporary culture.95  The survival of the practice, similar 
to the way Native Americans made maple syrup over 500 years ago, attests to some 
power or purpose wrapped up in the practice and left untouchable by instrumental 
reason.96    
I must add that some do attempt to justify why practical engagements of this sort 
are incorporated into our lives with instrumental reasons.  Robert Swain, in an interesting 
narrative where the scientific is woven into the practical engagements of gardening, does 
exactly this. 97  His discussion attempts to justify the time and resources he spends on 
making syrup by calculating the net energy output of the process.  It fails to provide a 
positive output of energy and in turn Swain fails to find, in instrumental reason, a 
justification for his practice.  But if we examine his train of thought, we can attempt to 
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extract a noninstrumental reason for his engagement that we could apply to Corey’s life 
and our lives:
I am searching for a reason to make maple syrup.  Years ago when I made it for 
the first time (a pint too dark to see through), I was motivated by curiosity.  But 
now I want an explanation for my continued interest in boiling sap, an explanation 
strong enough to explain why I spend eighteen hours at a stretch outdoors, my 
knees cooked, my beard singed, my feet freezing.  The few gallons of sticky-
sweet amber syrup scarcely seem adequate compensation for the long hours.  This 
search for justification is as time-consuming as the syrup making.  Tentative 
justifications appear on the horizon, get mulled over, and are shared with friends 
who drop by to watch the sap boil.  In recent years these have ranged from the 
metaphysical “It’s magic” to the economic “It’s cheap.”  Today it no longer seems 
like magic, and one visitor pointed out that even if I sold my entire year’s 
production I would still be earning only thirty-five cents an hour…98     
Later, Swain concludes, 
Somewhere there is the ultimate justification for making maple syrup.  The season 
for making it comes after the winter’s energy crisis and before the spring’s time 
crisis.  It is late enough in winter now not to have to worry about having enough 
fuel to get through, and early enough in the spring not to have to spend all one’s 
time readying the garden.  In this season the snow is soft and the sun seems 
warmer.  Tending the fire and watching the sap boil may just be an excuse to be 
outdoors, and that may be the only justification.  But until the buds swell and the 
sap turns cloudy, I intend to go on making maple syrup…99
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I believe Swain says a lot for the justification of making maple syrup, none of which he 
seems to be able to validate (even to himself) as a justification.  The “ultimate 
justification” for making maple syrup for people like Swain, Corey Sifter, and anyone 
who has the opportunity to be an amateur maple syrup producer is a moral justification.
Our culture isn’t very amenable to such justifications, but they are real and necessary and 
shouldn’t get brushed off as nostalgia. 
These practices add richness and color to our lives.  They provide the content that 
is missing in the framework established by the Rawlsian conception of justice.  And they 
give us a perspective on the forces that tend to sweep us away in contemporary culture, 
instead of suggesting that the practice itself could somehow replace the structure imposed 
by the culture as the Taylorian frameworks are supposed to do.  This perspective is an 
orientation.  Through it we can compare what the practice has to offer in contrast to the 
fulfillment, enrichment, and sense of orientation that the culture in general offers.  I have 
begun to draw the comparison in the examples taken from America America.  What 
remains to be shown is how a practice enriches our life without being a calling to turn our 
backs on society or rejecting technology outright.  This can be done by speaking for a 
practice that ties us to the world beyond the world of consumption, beyond merely 
instrumental practices, and beyond ease and efficiency without fulfillment or meaning.
The practice of making maple syrup is related to a thing, the maple tree and the 
forest it is a part of, and, as Heidegger suggests, a thing “gathers things in their belonging 
together.”  Consider what happens to Swain while he is making syrup: “Tentative 
justifications appear on the horizon, get mulled over, and are shared with friends who 
drop by to watch the sap boil.”  A justification for the activity is given, unknowingly, in 
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that very sentence.  The practice gathers friends to be with one another in a celebration of 
the season, the savor of the syrup, and the joy of conversation.
Other dimensions, depths, and colors that this practice can add to our lives can be 
found as testimony in Swain’s words.  He experiences the world in a way that no one else 
can unless they too engage in this practice.  Here the particularities are the source of 
richness and depth and his narrative is a signpost pointing in their direction and speaking 
for them.  First, he mentions that the result of his first syrup production was “a pint too 
dark to see through.”  This implies that he was once a novice and that as the seasons have 
passed he has gained experience and skill and his batches of syrup have improved, and he 
now, not only recognizes that syrup comes in different grades based on its transparency, 
but he is also able to work the process such that he can produce lighter, higher quality 
syrup.  
Making syrup each season isn’t just repeating what was done last year; it is 
coming in contact with the world once again through an engagement that employs skills 
such as strength, attentiveness, endurance.  All of these skills require nurturing and 
guidance.  The soil that will allow such skill to come to fruition is continued experience. 
And the fruit of such an engagement is accomplishment in the manner of engagement – 
not accomplishment solely with respect to the end result.  Further, to us who have never 
engaged in making maple syrup, ‘sap’ and ‘syrup’ are mere concepts to which we supply 
some vague understanding on the basis of our past experiences.  But Swain is able to give 
a depth to these concepts through his experience with their particularity.  Consider the 
following description: “sticky-sweet amber syrup.”  In this brief phrase we have three of 
our senses at work giving depth and dimension to a single concept.  The description 
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stems from intimate experience and knowledge of acquaintance and is good in itself. 
This is one of the results and justifications for practical engagements such as making 
maple syrup.  It is an achievement in familiarity, not innovation.  Practices breeding 
familiarity, as a footing upon which the good life is to be built, offer a depth to our lives 
that is the opposite of the uniformity and superficiality of pleasures offered by a 
consumer culture.              
The curiosity that Swain mentions as the first impulse to start making maple syrup 
is the attitude of openness to be informed, but also the openness to be captivated. 
Brushing up against the mysteries of the world, revealing their causes and conjecturing 
about their meaning, is a noble practice and good in itself.  Endless and random curiosity, 
though, can be debilitating.  With the practice of maple syrup production there is a closed 
system enveloped by the mystery of possibility and the diversity of contingency.  Our 
curiosity towards how sap is extracted, boiled, and filtered to become syrup can be 
satiated in theory, but its practical setting affords a bottomless wealth of the experience 
that I am arguing is morally important.  This type of practice and setting “keeps the mind 
amused and in spirits; by its exercise and regularity, it conduces to give vigor and health 
to the body.”100  This is what makes practical engagement morally necessary, even when 
descriptive knowledge claims to have tapped the wealth available in such a practice.  In 
our culture, we no longer pursue engagements that seem mysterious to us.  When we are 
at home in front of the television and then invited to go into the woods, it seems boring 
and a hassle and pointless.  We assume science has an answer to anything we are curious 
about, and we assume that technology has fulfilled any practical role necessary to a given 
process or phenomenon particular to our dwelling.  This assumption is correct most of the 
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time, but it doesn’t replace or strip practical engagement’s moral power or importance. 
Once we get up from the couch and go out into the woods, we return reanimated, 
confident, and hopeful.  It is odd that we would think that an engagement is not worthy of 
our participation since it has been described by science or given a technological 
replacement.  These things only heighten the experience we can have with a practical 
engagement that employs our skills of awareness, understanding, physical agility and 
endurance.  Science reveals different dimensions of what is happening before our eyes 
without exhausting the phenomena or our experience of them.
Swain continues to make maple syrup without justification.  He claims that its 
“metaphysical ‘magic’” is gone.  But that magic isn’t gone; it is just covered over.  His 
instrumental mind, in its pursuit of a justification for making syrup, fails to relax and be 
open again the way it was the first time he made syrup.  This is difficult for most of us. 
But I don’t believe it is the necessary path of practical engagement; I don’t think that all 
practical engagement starts off magical and ends up being unfulfilling or boring.  I think 
this is why Swain continues to make syrup.  He isn’t futilely searching for the experience 
he had when he first made syrup; the practice of making syrup always presents the 
conditions of possibility for us to be re-animated and filled with hope or awe about our 
condition, and he keeps returning to the “outdoors” to be next to it.  To be sure, our 
ability to meet that possibility is not always there.  There is a cognitive-emotional or 
psychological element that plays a fickle role in all our endeavors.  
One thing that helps us understand the importance of the psychological or 
cognitive element related to practical engagements is the comparison Heidegger makes 
between those who are currently physically next to a thing (the bridge in Heidelberg) but 
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miss its power and those who are contemplating it and have a different perspective on it. 
Speaking to those who are listening to his lecture far from the Heidelberg bridge, 
Heidegger says,  “From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge…from right here 
we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone 
who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing.”101  I think the reflective component 
grasps the more inclusive role building has with respect to our dwelling.  Technology, 
with its ability to conceal its power source and contextual relations, makes it difficult for 
us to contextualize anything.  Our capacity to cognitively contextualize something 
concrete is this reflective moment where we discover a realm between the concrete and 
the abstract.  It is our capacity to cognitively contextualize something concrete.  Within 
our minds the bridge need not be a concept standing on its own in abstract space; in our 
minds the bridge can be seen to tie us to different sides of the river that we need to get to 
in order to successfully dwell, and the bridge is captured as a part of a whole in relation 
to our dwelling and in turn can be constructed as such - likewise with the cultivation of 
sugar maples.  The justification for letting the trees stand and engaging with them in our 
particularly human way is that such a practice is part of the inclusive whole that is 
dwelling and because of this making syrup is a meaningful, significant activity.  As a way 
of life, pretending to be a tree (symbolic of Corey’s fatalism) or, worse, destroying the 
tree for no reason other than to replace it with a representation that strips it of any of its 
involvement character (the main impulse of contemporary culture), fails to find a rich 
way to connect itself as a practical engagement related to either our dwelling or the 
exercise of our capacities.
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When we think of how the maple tree and making maple syrup is related to our 
lives we can reflect, in a flash, on the unity of dwelling.  This flash reveals us as 
particular, embodied beings connected to a particular world that we are dependent upon. 
We see that what allows for maple syrup is a specific type of tree,  that even though this 
tree can be found in or transplanted to different parts of the world, only in the northeast of 
North America are the cool nights and warm days just right to make the sap flow.  We 
see that in the march of human history the cultural knowledge of this practice has 
survived and can be passed down, even between cultures, and if it isn’t, we fail to allow 
for “maple…to sweeten the cup of life.”102  
In the flash of reflection we see a family living on piece of land, tapping the trees, 
boiling sap, bottling syrup, preparing a breakfast, sitting down at the table where all of 
the conditions that have made the syrup possible have been gathered into an amber liquid 
that is to be consumed to provide sustenance and possibly joy.  Speaking of the taste of 
maple syrup John Burroughs writes, “It has a wild delicacy of flavor that no other sweet 
can match.  What you smell in freshly cut maple-wood, or taste in the blossom of the tree, 
is in it.  It is then, indeed, the distilled essence of the tree.”103  Encompassing more than 
just the trees in the importance of the taste of maple sugar, Native Americans rejected the 
use of West Indian cane sugar because maple sugar “tastes more fragrant – more of the 
forest.”104  To illuminate our moral ties and dependency upon the forests for the food it 
provides, we need to taste something other than what sits directly and conveniently in 
front of us.  We rather need to taste that which sits right in front of us and is directly tied 
to an entire world and so deepens and broadens our experience with the specific 
engagement of eating in our lives. 
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The mishaps and successes of a year’s harvest can enliven the conversation at the 
breakfast table; they can be laughed about and boasted about and act as a way of 
gathering and centering the family or community that participated in the harvest.  The 
arrival of the spring’s greenness can mean more than a new calendar page and a change 
of content in the mindless chatter about weather.  It can stand as a temporal marker that 
paces out our lives in terms of the seasons and connect us to the natural rhythms of the 
year.  We can say, “The buds are on the trees.  Another year is awakening.  Making 
maple syrup has ended for another year.  The syrup we have made will sweeten our 
mornings and our loved ones’ mornings for the year to come.  It will nourish me, and its 
fragrance and color will bring to mind the earth, trees, fire, and friends that made it 
possible.  I can be grateful for this.”  To be grateful is to affirm one’s life, and to affirm 
one’s life is to deem it meaningful.
Thoreau says that “There is little or nothing to be remembered written on the 
subject of getting an honest living.  Neither the New Testament nor Poor Richard speaks 
to our condition.  I cannot think of a single page which entertains, much less answers, the 
questions which I put to myself on the subject.  How to make the getting of our living 
poetic! For if it is not poetic, it is not life but death that we get.” 105  Responding to 
Thoreau, Helen and Scott Nearing write that, “Sugaring can bring one an honest living. 
And anyone who has ever sugared remembers the poesy of it to the end of his days. 
When the time of year comes around with sap rising and snow melting, there is an 
insistent urge to take one’s part in the process – to tap the trees, to gather the sap, to boil 
out the sweet syrup of the maple.” 106
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We can’t follow Helen and Scott and retreat into the woods of Vermont.  We must 
take responsibility for out nation and our world by supporting and fighting for justice and 
environmental protection and playing a role in the fabric of society.  If we were to go 
create our own community, it would only stand as an idol in relation to the society at 
large, tempting those who seek that way of life towards it.  But upon reflection we know 
that it is not a feasible or responsible option.  Instead, we should attempt to incorporate 
some practice that, to some degree, introduces that which can provide “poesy” to our 
lives and allow it to center our lives and act as the thing we orient the other aspects of our 
lives to and from which they unfold. 
Section Two.  Structure and Poesy in the Lives of Americans
Instead of proposing a radically new way in which individuals should structure 
their lives which would require at least some minor political revolution, I am proposing 
that we work from where we are and attempt to highlight and center our lives on that 
which is most important.  If the majority of people’s lives in America are structured 
around the five-day work week, of which each day is broken up into three meals, work, 
leisure, and sleep, where can poesy, engagement, and the eloquence of reality enter?  To 
speak in the most general way possible and without making any assumptions about the 
content of the majority of our lives, I am going to discuss how we can incorporate these 
elements into our lives through the preparation of food.  Although the practice of making 
maple syrup could be incorporated into the structure of Corey’s life, it can only be taken 
up with by a tiny fraction of Americans.  However, the less geographically specialized 
83
practice of food preparation that is discussed in Robert Farrar Capon’s The Supper of the 
Lamb can be worked into the philosophical framework that I employed in describing the 
practice of making maple syrup and can be applied to most anyone. 107
The thrust of my argument is that things provide orientation in our lives.  These 
things “gather things in their belonging together.”  When we find an appropriate way to 
incorporate a natural thing into the way in which we live or into what it means to dwell, it 
imports the eloquence of reality, and our engagement with it and any context it bespeaks, 
animates us and gives us the sense that we have done the best we can.  Things need 
people to speak for them if they are hidden or lost under the current of a way of life that 
ignores them.  In our society narratives can stand as testimony from people encountering 
things through familiarity.  
The natural ingredients in the food we prepare are always potentially gathering 
things.  Capon speaks for the onion.  He begins: “The onion is a thing, a being, just as 
you are.  The two of you sit here in mutual confrontation.  Together with knife, board, 
table and chair, you are the constituents of a place in the highest sense of the word.  This 
is a Session, a meeting, a society of things.”108  Capon uses the word session to emphasize 
the importance of an event related to or centered on a thing and embedded in a practice. 
Next, he emphasizes a sense of Heideggerian orientation:  “The uniqueness, the 
placiness, of places derives not from abstractions like location, but from confrontations 
like man-onion.”109  Capon goes beyond concretizing the notion of orientation.  He adds 
content, referring to things related to practices that are part of our living.  Capon suggests 
that we look onto the onion as if we had never seen one before.110  He wants us to be open 
to the mystery and contingency each individual onion possesses.  If we are open, there is 
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a bottomless depth of reality in front of us to fill us up.  Capon’s description of an onion 
is illuminating and new without being innovative: “an onion is not a sphere in repose.  It 
is a linear thing, a bloom of vectors thrusting upward from base to tip…See it as the 
paradigm of life that it - as one member of the vast living, gravity-defying troop that, 
across the face of the earth, moves light and airward as long as the world lasts…
Structurally, the onion is not a ball, but a nested set of finger within fingers, each thrust 
up from the base through the center of the one before it.  The outer digits are indeed 
swollen to roundness by the pressure of the inner, but their sphericity is incidental to the 
linear motion of flame inthrusting flame.”111  The description doesn’t end there but that is 
enough for the reader to catch the enthusiasm Capon has for the onion and the depth and 
dimension with which such a simple thing can be revealed to us.  There is an element of 
poesy and eloquence in his speech.  
Capon attributes the source of this eloquence, not to his sheer wit or creative 
power, but to the onion itself.  He suggests that the onion can whisper to him, and to us, if 
we are open to it.112  I point this out simply to show that the nature of things is translated 
to us from them, not from us projecting upon them.  More precisely: “Every time [man] 
diagrams something [or abstracts from something] instead of looking at it, every time he 
regards, not what a thing is but what it can be made to mean to him…reality slips away 
from him and he is left with nothing but the oldest monstrosity in the world: an idol.”113 
Making the distinction between the depth and eloquence of the thing versus the abstract 
space projected by technological devices, Capon concludes:  “One real thing is closer to 
God than all the diagrams in the world.”114 
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Letting these things into our home or lives is the first step.  Recognizing them and 
paying attention to them or listening to them is the next.  Third, we must figure out a way 
to respond to them.  The practice attached to the onion is the preparation of a meal with 
it.  Engaging our at first untutored skills with simple recipes, we can make the meals we 
prepare more challenging, more diverse, with no limit once the depth of an onion begins 
to reveal itself to us through our attentiveness to it.  Our sense of taste and smell will be 
honed as well as our experience in the art of cooking, and a sense of accomplishment can 
be taken from the meals we will eventually learn to make.  
Finally, there is the event where the meal can be a cause for celebration marked 
by gratefulness for the people it is shared with and the earth that has provided it.
The practice of preparing food and making maple syrup could help Corey orient 
his life.  It seems meager compared with the meaning that’s offered to those involved in 
great historical events like becoming president or winning a key battle in a war.  But 
when attempting to make the meaning of these great historical figures’ lives intelligible, 
we must ask, “Why be a courageous politician or a noble soldier?” and in doing so we are 
asking “What are you securing or attempting to secure for all?”  If our answer to this 
question is left contentless, we risk expending our energy in the form of strutting and 
fretting.  The questions must be dealt with all at once.  Recalling Rawls’ division of what 
is right and what is good, we must respond that they must come as a unity.  Rawls’ theory 
lacks the content that makes freedom and equality worth attaining beyond mere equal 
survival.  Without someone speaking for the practices that can import the experiences I 
have drawn from various narratives into our lives, our culture will simply march forward 
with the illusion that our lives can be whatever we want them to be and miss the fact that 
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the opportunities for meaningful and significant lives are evaporating.  Narratives that 
speak for certain practices and things can be the signposts pointing the way.  Philo-
sophers who can take these practices and articulate how they fit into what it means to live 
a significant life can be the guardians of the importance of such practices.          
The practice of making syrup and preparing food can be related to learning to play 
a musical instrument.  It is undeniable that there is a poesy and eloquence to music.  To 
think that we would replace our musical instruments with technologies that eliminate our 
role in the discovery and creation of music is almost preposterous.115  It is a category 
mistake to think that there can be innovative progress with respect to the violin the way 
that innovative progress is revered in relation to devices that have functionally similar 
instantiations, but are structurally completely different.116
 Our role in practices that are less artistic need not deviate from the norm set in 
place by what it is to truly play music.  Making practices easier or more efficient begins 
to strip them of the significance they can offer by making our engagement with them 
insignificant.  Speaking for the practice of making maple sugar, one author avoids the 
indefensible notion of nostalgia with the defendable notion of preciousness and poesy to 
combat instrumental reason. He or she writes:  “There is a human and poetic quality in 
maples, which is easily felt, and though the land would be worth more for its lumber than 
for its sugar, many farmers would no more part with their maple bush or orchard than 
with any precious heirloom.”117  Allowing the tangible conditions of significance to 
remain and then practicing engaging activities that are affiliated with the “poetic quality” 
of these things, while avoiding burdensome toil or nostalgia, is a principle we can employ 
when considering the practices we adopt to center our lives.    
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Extending the analogy of daily-life practices with music, the musician can 
become highly skilled and accomplish mastering difficult pieces of music.  Similarly, but 
not identically, an amateur sugar maker can become familiar with his forest and basic 
tools and hone his skill as well.  The same is true for the house cook.  But the musician 
can also perform a piece of music for a group of people and all can experience the poesy 
and eloquence that constitutes the music and during this experience one can say to 
oneself, “This makes me feel that life is a miracle.  I wish everyone could be here and 
experience this.”  The same is true about the gratefulness one feels at the breakfast table 
after a harvest of maple sugar or after a meal has been prepared. These events and 
practices invoke a response and furnish a content for which it is worth being free and 
equal.   
   Finally, orientation is found by incorporating a thing and a practice into our 
daily lives.  From this orientation we get a perspective on our other tasks, our work, our 
relationships, and our plan-of-life.  Our lives cannot be immediately restructured and 
traded for a life related to one thing and one practice.  We are simply to see what it is that 
a thing and a practice can offer that our usual experiences do not.  From that we can hope 
that our lives can unfold in a way that they become centered upon things and practices. 
And finally, we can speak for, defend, and point others towards that which we are most 
grateful for, and in doing so we can appropriately attend to the space left open for the 
good life as political justice is realized.  
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